



James Collier 1775



General and Rational

GRAMMAR, &c.



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General and Rational
GRAMMAR,

Containing the
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
OF THE
ART of SPEAKING,

Explained in a clear and natural manner.

With the reasons of the general agree-
ment, and the particular differences of
languages.

Translated from the French of
Messieurs de PORT-ROYAL.

LONDON,
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Katharine-Street, in the *Strand*.

MDCCLIII.

General and Rational
E R A M M A R

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
OF THE
ART OF WRITING

**MUSEVM
BRITANNICVM**

Translated from the French of
Monsieur de Font-Réaulx

LONDON
Printed by J. W. at the House of
Messrs. Smith, in the Strand.
MDCCLXXII



THE
PREFACE.

AS I have been engaged for some time in drawing up grammars of different languages, rather indeed by chance, than from any choice of my own; this has often occasioned my enquiry into the reasons of several things, which are either common to all, or particular to some languages. But having frequently met with difficulties which retarded my pursuit, I communicated them, as they arose, to a friend, who, tho' unpractised in this kind of literature, furnished me with several

P R E F A C E.

hints towards dispelling my doubts. My consulting him upon these difficulties, was the cause of his making various reflexions on the art of speaking, which he was pleased to impart to me in conversation; and I found them so very solid, that I scrupled to deprive posterity of them, having never met with any thing more curious or more exact upon the subject, either among the ancient or modern grammarians. As he had a great kindness for me, I prevailed on him to dictate those reflexions to me at his leisure hours; and having collected and digested them, I have ventured to send them abroad in the present form. Those who have a regard for works of reasoning, will perhaps meet with something here that will please them; and probably they will not condemn the subject: for if speech is one of the greatest
advan-

P R E F A C E.

advantages belonging to man, surely it is no contemptible thing to possess this advantage in its full extent, which consists not only in having the use of it, but moreover in understanding its nature, and in doing that by knowledge which others do by custom.



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
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A GENERAL and RATIONAL
GRAMMAR.



GRAMMAR is the art of speaking.

Speaking is to explain our thoughts by signs, which men have invented for that purpose.

Experience has shewn, that the most convenient signs are sounds, and the voice.

But as these sounds are transient, other signs have been devised, in order to render them durable and visible, which are the characters made use of in writing, by the Greeks called *γραμματα*, from whence comes the word *grammar*.

In these signs two things may be considered: the first is, their own nature, *viz.* as sounds and characters.

The second, their signification, *viz.* the manner in which men make use of them to express their thoughts.


We shall treat of the one in the first part of this Grammar; and of the other in the second.

B PART



PART I.

Which treats of letters, or characters, used
in writing.



CHAP. I.

*Of letters as sounds, and in the first place of
vowels.*

THE various sounds used in discourse, and called letters, have been found out in a very natural manner, which it is well worth our while to observe.

For as the mouth is the organ which forms them it has been remarked, that there are some sounds so simple, that they require only the bare opening of the mouth to make them understood, and to form distinct sounds, whence they are called *vowels*.

It has been likewise remarked, that there are other sounds, which depend upon the particular application of some part of the mouth, as of the Teeth, the lips, the tongue, the palate, and yet cannot

not form any complete sound but by the same opening of the mouth, that is, by their union with the first kind of sounds; and for this reason they are called *consonants*.

They reckon generally five of these vowels, *a*, *e*, *i*, *o*, *u*; but, not to mention that each of these may be either short or long, from whence ariseth a very considerable variety in the sound, it seems that, only considering the difference of the simple sounds, according to the various openings of the mouth, there might have been still four or five vowels added to the five preceding. For the *e* open, and the *e* shut, are two sounds sufficiently different to make two different vowels, as in the French, *mer*, *the sea*, *abymër*, *to send to the bottom*; likewise as the first and last *e* in the French words *netteté*, *cleanliness*, *serré*, *shut*, &c.

The same also may be said of the *o* open, and the *o* shut, as in the french words, *côte*, *the coast*, or *a rib*, and *cotte*, *a pettycoat*; *bôte*, *a landlord*, and *botte*, *a scuttle*. For the *e* open, and the *o* open, have something long in their nature; and the *e* shut, and *o* shut, have a sort of brevity in theirs; yet these two vowels differ more, by being open and shut, than an *a* or an *i*, by being long or short: and this is one of the reasons, why the Greeks have thought proper to invent two figures for each of these two vowels, rather than for any of the other three.

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Moreover, *u* pronounced like the french *ou*, as it was formerly by the Latins, and is at present by the Italians and Spaniards, has quite a different sound from *u*, as formerly pronounced by the Greeks, and at present by the French.

Eu, as it is pronounced in the french words *feu*, *fre*, *peu*, *little*, forms likewise a simple sound, though it be written with two vowels.

There remains the *e* mute, or feminine, which originally is no more than an obscure sound, joined to consonants, when we want to pronounce them without a vowel, as when they are followed immediately by other consonants; for instance, in the word *scamnum*: this is what the Hebrews call *schewa*, especially when it begins a syllable. And this *schewa* necessarily occurs in all languages, though it is not so much taken notice of, because it has no particular character to express it. But some vulgar languages, as the German and the French, have characterized it by the vowel *e*, adding this sound to the others which it had already besides, they have so ordered it, that this *e* feminine makes one syllable with its consonant, as the second in the french words *netteté*, *cleanliness*, *j'aimeray*, *I will love*, *donneray*, *I will give*, &c. which was not effected by the *schewa* in other languages: though several are apt to commit this mistake in pronouncing the Hebrew *schewa*. But what is still more remarkable, is, that
this

this *e* mute oftentimes makes of itself alone a syllable in French, or rather a demi-syllable, as *vie, life, vuë, fight, aimée, beloved.*

Thus, without considering the difference, which arises between vowels of the same sound, through length or brevity, we might point out ten different vowels, attending only to the simple sounds, and not to the characters : *a, é, ê, i, o, ô, eu, ou, u, e* mute.

Where it is observable, that these sounds are taken from the widest to the most contracted opening of the mouth.



CHAP. II.

Of consonants.

IF we do but proceed in the same manner with regard to the consonants, as we have done when treating of the vowels, and consider only the simple sounds, which are in use in the principal languages, we shall find, there are no more than those marked in the following table ; wherein, whatsoever requires an explanation, is distinguished by figures, which refer to the next page.

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Consonants which have only a simple sound.

<i>Latin and Vulgar.</i>	<i>Greek.</i>	<i>Hebrew.</i>
B, b.	B, β.	ב. ¹ Beth.
P, p.	Π, π.	פ. Pe.
F, f, ² ph.	Φ, φ.	3.
V, v, consonant.	Δ, δ.	5.
C, c, ⁶ .	Κ, κ.	כ. Caph.
G, g, ⁷ .	Γ, γ.	ג. Gimel.
j, consonant.	*	י. Jod.
D, d.	Δ, δ.	ד. Daleth.
T, t.	Τ, τ.	ט. Teth.
R, r.	Ρ, ρ.	ר. Resch.
L, l.	Λ, λ.	ל. Lamed.
ll, ⁸ .	*	*
M, m.	Μ, μ.	מ. Mem.
N, n.	Ν, ν.	נ. Nun.
gn, ⁹ .	*	*
S, s.	Σ, σ.	ס. Samech.
Z, z.	Ζ, ζ. ¹⁰ .	ז. Zaiin.
Ch, ch, ¹¹ .	*	ח. Schin.
H, h, ¹² .	ε. ¹³ .	ה. ¹⁴ Heth.

1. With a point, called a *dagesch lene*.

2. The φ is pronounced at present in the same manner as the Latin *f*, tho' formerly it was uttered with a stronger breathing.

3. 'Tis

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3. 'Tis thus also the Hebrew *pe*, is pronounced, when it is unpointed, as when it ends a syllable.

4. This is the figure of the Eolic *digamma*, which was like a double *gamma*, and has been inverted to distinguish it from a capital *f*; and this *digamma* had the same sound as *w* consonant.

5. This is also the sound of *beth*, when it ends a syllable.

6. Every where pronounced as before *a, o, u*, that is like a *k*.

7. Pronounced always as before *a, o, u*.

8. *l*, as in the French word, *fille, a daughter*. The Spaniards make use of it in the beginning of words, as *llama*. The Italians mark it by *gl*.

9. *n*, a liquid, which the Spaniards mark by a dash over the *n*, and the French and Italians by *gn*.

10. As it is pronounced at present, for formerly it was pronounced like a *de*.

11. As it is pronounced in the French words *chose, a thing; cher, dear, &c.*

12. Asperated, as in the French *bauteur, height; bonte, shame*, and in the English words, *have, heavy*: for when it is not asperated, as in the French words, *honneur, honor, homme, a man*, and in the English words, *humour, humours, honesty*, it is only a character, and not a sound.

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13. The rough breathing of the Greeks, instead of which they formerly made use of the *Eta*, *H*, from whence the Latins have borrowed their *H*.

14. According to its true sound, which is with a breathing.

If there are some other simple sounds (such as perhaps the Hebrew aspiration *aiin*) these are so very difficult to be pronounced, that they can hardly be ranked among the letters, which are commonly used in languages.

With regard to all the other letters in the Hebrew, Greek, Latin, or vulgar alphabets, 'tis an easy matter to prove that they are not simple sounds, but reducible to some of those given in the preceding table.

For of the four Hebrew gutturals, 'tis very probable, that *aleph* was formerly equivalent to our *a*; their *he* to our *e*; and their *aiin* to our *a*. This appears by the order of the Greek alphabet, which was borrowed from the Phœnicians as far as τ ; so that only the letter *beth*, was properly an aspiration.

At present *aleph* has no sound, but that of the vowel, to which it is joined.

The letter *he* has not much more; and at the most is distinguished from *beth* only as one is a weaker, and the other a stronger aspiration; tho' several insist that *he* only is the aspiration; and chuse to pronounce *beth* like a χ , *cheth*. As

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As for *aiin*, some pronounce it with a guttural and nasal aspiration; but the Oriental Jews give it no sound at all, no more than to *aleph*. And others pronounce it like a liquid \bar{n} .

Thau and *teth*, have the same sound, and the only difference is, that one is pronounced with a breathing, and the other without; and consequently one of the two is not a simple sound.

The same may be said of *capb* and *coph*.

Tfade likewise is not a simple sound, but is equivalent to a *t* and an *s*.

In like manner in the Greek alphabet, the three aspirates ϕ , χ , θ , are not simple sounds, but compounded of π , κ , τ , with a rough breathing.

And the three duplicates ζ , ξ , ψ , are evidently no more than abbreviations in writing, instead of *ds*, *cs*, *ps*.

The same may be said of the Latin κ , which answers to the Greek ξ .

The letters *q* and *k*, are nothing more than *c*, pronounced in its natural sound.

The *w* of the Northern languages is only a Roman κ , that is the same as the French *ou*, when followed by a vowel, as *winum vinum*: or the same as a *w* consonant, when followed by a consonant.

C H A P. III.

Of Syllables.

A Syllable is a complete sound, which sometimes consists of a single letter, but generally of more than one; from whence it has taken its name of syllable, συλλαβή, *a collection, or assemblage.*

One vowel may constitute a single syllable.

Two vowels likewise may compose a syllable, or be blended in the same syllable: but then they are called diphthongs, because both their sounds are united in order to form a complete sound, as in the French words, *mien, mine; hier, yesterday; ayant, having; eau, water.*

The diphthong is generally lost in the ordinary pronunciation of the Latin, for their *æ* and their *œ*, are pronounced now like an *e*. But it is still preserved in the Greek, at least by those who pronounce it right.

As for the vulgar languages, sometimes two vowels form only a simple sound, as we have observed of the French *eu*, and is also seen in their *au*. And yet they have some real diphthongs, as *ai, ayant, having; ôie fouët, a whip; oi, foi, faith; ie, mien, mine; premier, first; eau, beau, handsome; itu, Dieu, God; where 'tis observable, that the two last are not triph-*

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triphthongs, as some imagine; because *eu* and *au* have only the sound of a simple vowel, and not of two.

Consonants cannot of themselves compose a syllable; but they must be joined to vowels or diphthongs, whether they precede, or follow them, the reason of which has been hinted at in the first chapter.

Nevertheless several consonants may be joined successively in the same syllable; so that there may be sometimes three before a vowel and two after, as *scropt*: and sometimes two before, and three after, as *stirps*. The Hebrews never admit of more than two at the beginning or end of a syllable: and their syllables begin always with a consonant, but then we must reckon *aleph* for one: And a syllable has never more than one vowel.



C H A P. IV.

Of words as sounds, as likewise of accents.

WE do not intend to treat here of words, as significative; but only of their nature and property as sounds.

We call a word, whatever is pronounced and written separately. There are some of one syllable, as

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me, from, thou, king, &c. which are called monosyllables; and others of more than one, as *father, governor, mercifully, Constantinople, &c.* which are called polysyllables.

The most remarkable thing in the pronouncing of words, is the accent; this is the elevation of the voice on some particular syllable of the word, which elevation is necessarily followed by a depression of the voice.

The elevation of the voice is called an *acute* accent, and the depression a *grave* accent. But as there were both in Greek and Latin some long syllables, on which the voice was elevated and depressed, they therefore invented a third accent, which they called *circumflex*; this at first was made thus (ˆ) and afterwards thus (˘) and comprizes the other two.

But as for what regards the intire knowledge and use of the Greek and Latin accents, I refer the reader to what has been said on this subject in the new methods of learning the Greek and Latin tongues.

The Hebrews have several accents, which are supposed to have been formerly used in their music, and are now by many applied to the same use as our points or stops.

But the accents, which they call natural or grammatical, are always upon the penultimate, or the
ulti-

ultimate syllable. Those that are on the preceding syllables, are called rhetorical accents, and don't at all hinder the others from being always upon one of the two last: where 'tis observable that the same figure of accent, as the *atnach* and the *filluk*, which mark the distinction of periods, serves also to point out at the same time the natural accent.



CHAP. V.

Of letters considered as characters.

IT was impossible for us to have hitherto treated of letters, without distinguishing them by their characters; nevertheless we have not as yet considered them as characters, that is according to the relation which these characters have to sounds.

We have already observed, that sounds have been pitched upon by men to signify their thoughts, and that they have likewise invented certain figures which should serve as signs of these sounds. But tho' these figures or characters in their original institution do not immediately signify any thing more than the sounds, yet men frequently transfer their thoughts of the characters to the very thing

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thing signified by the sounds. Hence it is that these characters may be considered in two different manners: either as merely signifying the sound; or as assisting us to form a conception of the thing signified by the sound.

In examining them in the first manner, there should have been four things strictly observed, in order to give them their utmost degree of perfection.

1. Every figure should signify some sound or other: that is, nothing should be marked down in writing, but what is pronounced.

2. Every sound ought to be marked by a figure; that is, nothing should be pronounced, but what is written.

3. No figure ought to mark more than one sound, either simple, or double. For double letters are no obstruction to the perfection of writing, but rather facilitate it by abbreviating.

4. The same sound should never be marked by different figures.

But viewing these characters in the second light; that is, as they help us to apprehend the thing signified by the sound; we may sometimes find it better to break through these rules, at least the first and last.

For 1. It frequently happens, especially in derivative languages, that there are some letters, which are not pronounced, and consequently are useless with

with regard to the sound; and yet are of some service in leading us to the knowledge of the thing signified by the words. For instance in the French words *champs*, *fields*, and *chants*, *songs*, the *h* and the *t*, are not pronounced, and yet they are of some utility with respect to the signification, because we understand thereby, that the first comes from the Latin *campi*, and the second from the Latin *cantus*.

Moreover in the Hebrew there are some words, whose only difference consists in this, that the one ends with an *aleph*, and the other with an *he*, which are not pronounced, as *סֵף* which signifies to *fear*; and *טֵף* which signifies to *throw*.

Hence 'tis manifest, that those who exclaim so loudly against the practice of writing differently from what is pronounced, are not always in the right; and that what they call an abuse, is not sometimes without its utility.

The difference of capital and small letters seems also contrary to the fourth rule: which is that the same sound should be always marked with the same figure. And indeed this difference would be of no manner of service, if characters were considered only as marks of sounds; by reason that a capital and a small letter have the very same sound. Hence it is that the ancients made no such distinction, as the Hebrews do not to this very day; and several are of opinion, that the Greeks and Romans for
a long

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a long time, used only capital letters. Nevertheless this distinction is very serviceable for pointing out the commencement of periods, and discriminating proper from common names.

There are also in the same language different sorts of writing, as the Roman and Italic in the impression of the Latin, and of several vulgar tongues, which may be usefully employed with regard to the signification either in distinguishing particular words, or in pointing out particular speeches; tho' this produces no change in the pronunciation.

Thus far as to what may be alledged in defence of the diversity that sometimes occurs between pronouncing and writing. Yet we cannot help acknowledging, that there are several differences entirely groundless, and the meer effect of the corruption which has crept into languages. For 'tis certainly an abuse to pronounce, for instance, *c*, like *e* before *e* and *i*: likewise to pronounce the *g* differently before these two same vowels, from what it is pronounced before the rest: as also to soften the *s* between two vowels: and to give to *i* the sound of *s*, before *i*, when followed by another vowel, as in *gratia*, *actio*. But as to what may be farther said on this subject, I refer the reader to the treatise of letters in the new method of the Latin tongue.


Some have imagined they could redress this defect in the vulgar languages, by devising new characters,

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as Ramus hath done in his French Grammar, retrenching all those which are not pronounced, and marking each sound by the figure or letter, to which this pronunciation is proper: for instance, by putting an *s* instead of a *c*, before *e*, and *i*. But they ought to consider, that, besides the inconvenience which would frequently arise from hence in vulgar languages, for the reasons already mentioned, it is really attempting an impossibility. For we are not to imagine, that 'tis an easy matter, to induce a whole nation to change so many characters, which she has been long accustomed to; since even the Emperor Claudius, with all his authority, could not introduce a new character.

The most reasonable thing that could be done, would be to retrench such letters, as are of no use, either as to the pronunciation, or the sense, or the analogy of languages, as they have already begun to do in French: and while we retain those which are of use, to distinguish them with small marks, which should give us to understand that they are not to be pronounced, or should point out the different pronunciations of the same letter. A point within or under a letter, might very well serve for the first use, as in the French word *temps*, *time*. The *c* in French hath its *cedill*, or little mark underneath, which might be affixed to the *e* and the *i*, as well as to the other two vowels. A *g* with a tail not quite

quite shut, might be applied to distinguish the sound it has before *e* and *i*. But let this be understood only for example.



C H A P. VI.

*Of a new method of learning easily to read in
all languages.*

THIS method concerns chiefly those, who have not as yet learnt to read.

'Tis certain, that there is no great difficulty for beginners, to attain to the simple knowledge of the letters; the principal labour they go thro', is in spelling, or in putting the letters together.

Now what renders this still more difficult is, that each letter having its particular name is pronounced differently by it self from what it is, when joined with others. For instance, to make a child spell *fry*, they bid him pronounce *ef*, *er*, *ay*, which cannot avoid embarrassing him, when afterwards he tries to join these three sounds together, in order to form the sound of the syllable *fry*.

The most natural way therefore of teaching children to read, as some ingenious persons have already observed, would be, to make them learn their

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their letters by the names in which they are pronounced. Thus to learn to read Latin, for instance, they should give the same name to the *e* simple, as to the diphthongs *æ* and *œ*, because they are pronounced in the same manner: as also to *i*, and to *y*: and to *o* and *au*, according as the latter is now pronounced in France. For the Italians make *au* a diphthong.

They should also be taught to name the consonants by their natural sound, only adding the *e* mute, which is necessary in order to pronounce them: For example, they should take the name of *b*, from the sound, which it has in the last syllable of the French word *tombe*; and that of *d*, from the sound, of the last syllable of the French *ronde*; and in like manner the rest, which have only a single sound.

With regard to those, which have more sounds than one, as *c*, *g*, *t*, *s*, they should be called by their most natural and ordinary sound; thus *c* should be named by the sound of *que* in French, and *g* by that of *gue*, *t*, by that of the last of *forte*, and *s* by the sound of the last syllable of *bourse*.

They should afterwards be taught to pronounce separately, and without calling the letters, the syllables, *ce*, *ci*, *ge*, *gi*, *tia*, *tie*, *tii*. And they should be made to understand, that the *s*, between two vowels, is pronounced like an *æ*, *miseria*, *mifery*, as if it were *mizeria*, *mizery*, &c.

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These are the most general observations of the new method of learning to read, which would certainly be of very great service to children. But to render this method intirely complete, would require a treatise by it self, in which such remarks might be inserted, as are proper for accommodating it to all languages.





THE
SECOND PART
OF THE
GENERAL GRAMMAR.

Which treats of the principles and reasons,
on which the various forms of the signi-
fication of words are founded.



CHAP. I.

*That the knowledge of what passes in the
mind, is necessary, to comprehend the foun-
dation of grammar: and on this depends
the diversity of words which compose dis-
course.*

Hitherto we have treated of words, only with
respect to their material part, and as they are
common, at least in respect to the sound, to men
and parrots.

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It remains now that we examine their spiritual part, which constitutes one of the most considerable advantages of man above all other animals, and is one of the most convincing arguments in favor of reason. This is the use we make of them to explain our thoughts, and the marvellous invention of composing out of 25 or 30 sounds that infinite variety of words, which tho' they have no natural resemblance to the operations of the mind, are yet the means of unfolding all its secrets, and of disclosing unto those, who cannot see into our hearts, the variety of our thoughts, and our sentiments upon all manner of subjects.

Words therefore may be defined, distinct and articulate sounds, made use of by men as signs, to express their thoughts.

We cannot therefore perfectly understand the different sorts of significations, annexed to words, without first considering what passes in our minds, since words were invented only to communicate our thoughts.

'Tis the general doctrine of philosophers, that there are three operations of the mind: *Perception*, *Judgment*, and *Reasoning*.

Perception is no more than the simple apprehension or view which the understanding forms of the objects acting upon it, whether purely intellectual, as when I think of existence, duration, cogitation, God: or corpo-

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corporeal and material, as a square, a circle, a dog, a horse.

Judgment is, when we affirm, that the thing which we conceive or apprehend, is so, or not so: as for instance, when I understand what the *earth* is, and what *roundness* is, I affirm; that the *earth* is *round*.

Reasoning is, from two judgments to infer a third. As when having affirmed, that virtue is commendable, and that patience is a virtue, I draw an inference, that patience is commendable.

Hence it is plain, that the third operation of the mind is only an extension of the second. It will therefore suffice for our present subject, to take only the two first into our consideration, and as much of the first, as is comprized in the second. For men seldom mean to express their bare perceptions of things, but generally to convey their judgments concerning them.

The judgment, which we form of things, as when I say, *the earth is round*, is called a *proposition*; and therefore every proposition necessarily includes two terms, one called the *subject*, which is the thing of which the affirmation is; as *the earth*; and the other is called the *attribute*, which is the thing that is affirmed of the subject, as *round*: and moreover the connexion between these two terms, namely the substantive verb, *is*.

Now

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
Now 'tis easy to see, that the two terms belong properly to the first operation of the mind, because that is what we conceive, and is the object of our thoughts; and the connexion belongs to the second, being properly the action of the mind, and the mode or manner of thinking.

Thus the greatest distinction of what passes in our minds, is to say, that we may consider the objects of our thoughts, and the form or manner of them, the chief of which is judgment. But we ought likewise to refer thither the conjunctions, disjunctions, and the like operations of the mind; as also all the other motions of the soul; as desires, commands, interrogations, &c.

Hence it follows, that men having occasion for signs to express what passes in the mind, the most general distinction of words must be this, that some signify the objects, and others the form or manner of our thoughts; tho' it frequently happens that they do not signify the manner alone, but in conjunction with the object, as we shall make appear hereafter.

The words of the first sort are those which are called *nouns, articles, pronouns, participles, prepositions, and adverbs*. Those of the second are, *verbs, conjunctions, and interjections*. Which are all derived by a necessary consequence from the natural manner of expressing our thoughts, as we shall soon demonstrate.

C H A P.



C H A P. II.

Of nouns, and first of substantives and adjectives.

THE objects of our thoughts are either things, as the *earth, the sun, water, wood*, which are commonly called *substances*: Or the manner of things, as to be *round, red, hard, learned, &c.* which are called *accidents*.

There is this difference between the things or substances, and the manner of things, or accidents; that the substances subsist by themselves, but the accidents subsist only by the substances.

Hence arises the principal difference between words, which signify the objects of our thoughts. For those which signify substances, are called *nouns substantive*; and those which signify accidents, by expressing the subjects with which these accidents agree, are called *nouns adjective*.

This is the first original of nouns *substantive* and *adjective*. But they have not stopt here: for we find that the signification it self has not been so much attended to, as the manner of signifying. For, because the sub-

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stance

stance is that which subsists by it self, the appellation of nouns substantive has been given to all those words, which subsist by themselves in discourse, without wanting to be joined to another noun, even tho' they signify no more than accidents. On the contrary the name of adjectives has been applied even to those words, which signify substances, when by their manner of signifying, they are to be joined to other nouns in discourse.

Now the reason why a noun cannot subsist by it self, is that besides its distinct signification, there is still another more confused, which may be called the connotation of a thing, to which that agrees which is meant by the distinct signification.

Thus the distinct signification of *red*, is *redness*. But it has this signification, by expressing confusedly the subject of this redness; hence it does not subsist by it self in discourse, because the word, which signifies this subject, must be either expressed or understood.

As therefore this connotation constitutes the adjective, so when that is taken away from words which signify accidents, they become substantives, as from *coloured*, *color*; from *red*, *redness*; from *hard*, *hardness*; from *prudent*, *prudence*, &c.

On the contrary when we add to words which signify substances, this connotation or confused signification of a thing, to which the substances have
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relation, they become adjectives, as *man*, *manly*, &c.

The Greeks and Latins have an infinite number of these words, *ferreus*, *aureus*, *bovinus*, *vitulinus*, &c.

But the Hebrew, French, and several other vulgar languages have not near so many. For the French render it by their *de*: *d'or*, *de fer*, *de bœuf*, &c.

But if we strip these adjectives formed of nouns substantive, of their connotation, they constitute new substantives called *derivatives*. Thus of *man* having formed *human*, of *human* we form *humanity*, &c.

But there is another sort of nouns, which pass for substantives, tho' in reality they are adjectives, since they signify an accidental form, and likewise denote a subject to which that form agreeth. Such are the names of the different offices and professions of men, as *king*, *philosopher*, *painter*, *soldier*, &c. And the reason why these nouns pass for substantives, is that as nothing but man can be their subject, at least according to the common way of speaking and the original imposition of names, so it has not been thought necessary to join their substantives with them, since they may be understood without any confusion, having no relation to any other subject. By this means these words have obtained what is particular to substantives, *viz.* to subsist by themselves in discourse.

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'Tis for this very reason, certain nouns or pronouns are said to be taken substantively, because they relate to a substantive so general, that it is easily and determinately understood, as *triste lupus stabulis*, subaud. *negotium*: *patria*, subaud. *terra*: *Judaea*, sub. *Provincia*. See the new Latin method.

Adjectives, I have observed, have two significations; one distinct, which is that of the form; and the other confused, which is that of the subject. But it is not to be inferred from thence, that they signify the form more directly than the subject, as if the most distinct signification were also the most direct. For quite the reverse, it is certain they signify the subject directly, and, to make use of the grammatical expression, *in recto*, tho' more confusedly; and as to the form, they signify it indirectly, and as the grammarians again express it, *in obliquo*, tho' more distinctly. Thus *white*, *candidus*; signifies directly that, which has whiteness, *habens candorem*, but in a very confused manner, without specifying in particular any of those things, which may have whiteness; and it signifies whiteness only indirectly, but in as distinct a manner, as the word whiteness itself, *candor*.

CHAP. III.

Of proper names, and appellative or general names.

THERE are two sorts of ideas, one which represents to us only a single thing; as the idea, which each person has of his father and mother, of his friend, of his horse, his dog, of himself, &c.

The other which represents to us several similar things, to which this idea equally agrees, as the idea I have of a man in general, of a horse in general, &c.

Men had occasion for different names to express these two different sorts of ideas.

They have given the appellation of *proper names*, to those, which agree to single ideas, as the name of *Socrates*, which agrees to a certain philosopher; the name of *Paris*, which agrees to a particular city.

They have called *general or appellative names, or nouns*, those, which signify common ideas; as the word *man*, which agrees to all men in general; and in like manner the words, *lion, dog, horse, &c.*

Not but that the proper name frequently agrees with many, as *Peter, John, &c.* But this is only by accident, by reason that several have taken the same name. In that case, however, other names must be added to fix and restore the quality of a proper name; as the name of *Lewis*, which agrees to several, becomes proper to the present king of *France*, by saying *Lewis the fifteenth*. It often happens, that there is no occasion for making any addition, because the circumstances of the discourse sufficiently point out the person, who is spoken of.

CH A P. IV.

Of numbers singular and plural.

COMMON names that agree to many, may be considered several ways.

For 1, they may be either applied to one of the things, to which they agree; or they may all be considered in a certain unity, which by the philosophers is called *universal unity*.

2. They may be applied to several together, considering them as several.

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In order to distinguish these two sorts of ways of signifying, two numbers have been invented. The singular, as *homo, a man*; and the plural, as *homines, men*.

Some languages, as the Greek, have invented a dual number, viz. when the names agree to two only.

The Hebrews also have a dual; but this is only when the words signify a thing double, either by nature, as the *eyes, the hands, the feet, &c.*; or by art, as *scissars, tongs, &c.*

Hence it is obvious, that proper names have not of themselves a plural, by reason that of their nature they agree only to one. And if sometimes they are put in the plural, as when we say the *Cæsars, the Alexanders, the Plato's*, this is done figuratively; by comprizing under the proper name all those persons who bear any resemblance to them: just as if we were to say, *the kings as brave as Alexander; the philosophers as wise as Plato, &c.* There are some who censure this manner of speaking, as not sufficiently conformable to nature; tho' there are examples of it in all languages: insomuch that it seems too much authorized, to be entirely rejected. We should be careful however to use it with moderation.

On the contrary, all adjectives ought to have a plural, because their nature is always to include a sort

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of vague signification of a subject, which renders them capable of agreeing with several, at least as to the manner of signifying; tho' in fact they agree only with one.

With regard to substantives, that are common and appellative, they ought, it seems, by their nature to have always a plural number: and yet there are several that have none, whether thro' the prevalence of custom, or for some sort of reason. Thus the names of metals, as *gold, silver, iron*, have no plural in almost all languages: the reason of which I fancy to be this, that because of the great resemblance there is between the parts of metals, we generally consider each species of metal, not as comprizing several individuals under it; but as a whole which only contains several parts. The force of this observation appears more conspicuous in the French language, where to express a singular metal they add the particle of partition; *de l'or, gold, de l'argent, silver, du fer, iron*. They use indeed *fers* in the plural, but then it is to signify *chains*, and not meerly a part of the metal called *fer, iron*. The Latins likewise say *ara*, but then it is to signify money, or sounding instruments, as the cymbal, &c.

CHAP. V.

Of genders.

AS the nature of nouns adjective is to agree to many, it has been therefore thought proper to invent a diversity in the adjectives, according to the substantives, to which they agree; in order to render the discourse less confused, and to embellish it with variety of terminations.

Now men have made themselves the first subject of their consideration, and upon observing a very remarkable difference, which is that of the two sexes, they have thought proper to vary the same nouns adjective, by giving them different terminations, as they are applied to men, or women; as when we say in Latin, *bonus vir*, a good man, *bona mulier*, a good woman. From whence comes the denomination of masculine and of feminine gender.

But there was a necessity for carrying the thing still further. For as these same adjectives might have been attributed to other things besides men and women, they were obliged to give them one or

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other of the terminations, which they had invented for men and women. For which reason they have ranged all other nouns substantive under the heads of *masculine* or *feminine*: sometimes indeed with some sort of reason, as when the names of offices or professions of men, as *rex*, *judex*, *philosophus*, &c. (which, as we have already observed, are only improperly substantives) are of the masculine gender, because *homo* is understood; and the offices of women are of the feminine gender, as *mater*, *uxor*, *regina*, &c. by reason that *mulier* is understood.

Sometimes this happens thro' meer caprice, and without any other reason than the influence of custom; therefore it varies according to the languages, and even in those words which one language has borrowed of another: thus *arbor*, a tree, in the Latin is feminine, and *arbre* in the French is masculine; *dens*, a tooth, in the Latin is masculine, and *dent* in the French is feminine.

Nay sometimes this has changed in one and the same language, according to time and occasions: thus, *alvus*, was formerly of the masculine gender in the Latin, as *Priscian* observes; and afterwards became a feminine: *navire*, a ship, in French was anciently feminine, and now is become masculine.

This same variation of custom has been the cause, that the same word being used by some in one gender,

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der, and by others in another, is become doubtful; as *hic* or *hæc finis* in Latin; and *le* or *la comte*; and *ducé* in French.

But that which is called the common gender, is not so common as grammarians imagine. For in rigor it agrees only to some names of animals, which in Greek and Latin are indifferently joined to masculine and feminine adjectives, to express either the male or female, as *bos*, *an ox*, or *a cow*; *canis*, *a dog*, or *a bitch*; *sus*, *a hog*, or *a sow*.

There are other nouns comprized under the common gender, which are properly nothing more than adjectives, taken substantively, by reason that they commonly subsist by themselves in discourse, without having different terminations to agree to different genders, as the following happen to have, *victor* & *victrix*, *rex* & *regina*, *pistor* & *pistrix*, &c.

Hence it is manifest, that what the grammarians call *epicene*, is not a distinct gender. For *vulpes a fox*, tho' it indifferently signifies the male or female, is really of the feminine gender in the Latin. In like manner in French, *aigle*, *an eagle*, is really feminine; by reason that the masculine or feminine gender in a word, does not so properly regard its signification, as that it should be of such a nature, as to join with adjectives in the masculine or feminine termination. Thus in Latin, *custodiæ*, *guards*, or *prisoners*, *vigilia*, *centinels*, or *watchmen*, are

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really feminine, tho' they signify men. This is what is common to all languages with regard to genders.

The Greeks and Latins have added a third gender to the masculine and feminine, which they call *neuter*, as being of neither. In this they have not been directed by reason, as they very well might, so as to attribute the neuter to the names of things, which bear no relation to the male or female sex; but by fancy, and the termination of certain words.

XX

C H A P VI.

Of cases, and of prepositions inasmuch as it is necessary to treat of them for the understanding of some cases.

IF things were always considered separately from one another, nouns would have received only the two abovementioned changes, *viz.* that of number for all sorts of nouns, and that of gender for the adjectives. But as they are frequently considered in the different relations, which they have to one another; some languages have contrived to express these relations, by giving the nouns different terminations

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nations or endings which they call *cases*; from the Latin *cadere*, *to fall*, being, as it were, the different falls of a word.

True it is, that the Greek and Latin are perhaps the only languages, in which the nouns have properly cases. Nevertheless as there are very few, which have not some sort of cases in their pronouns, and as without that it would be difficult to have a right understanding of the connexion of discourse, commonly called *construction*, it seems almost necessary for the knowledge of any language whatsoever, to know what is meant by these cases. We shall endeavour therefore to explain them in order, with as much perspicuity as possible.

Of the nominative.

The simple position of the noun is called the *nominative*, which is not properly a case, but the matter from which the cases are formed, by the various changes, which this first termination of the noun receives. Its principal use is to be set in discourse before the verb, in order to be the subject of the proposition; as *Dominus regit me*, *the Lord governs me*; *Deus exaudit me*, *God hears me*.

Of the vocative.

When we name the person to whom we speak, or the thing to which we address our selves, as if it were

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were a person, the noun acquires thereby a new relation, which is sometimes marked by a new termination, called the *vocative*. Thus from *dominus* in the nominative, we form *domine* in the vocative; from *Antonius*, *Antoni*. But as there was no very great necessity for this, and as the nominative might be employed for this use, hence it has happened,

1. That this different termination of the nominative from the vocative is not used in the plural number.

2. That even in the singular number, the Latins use it only in the second declension.

3. That in the Greek, where it is more common, it is frequently omitted, and the nominative is used instead of the vocative, as may be seen in the Greek version of the psalms, from whence S. Paul. cites these words in his epistle to the *Hebrews*, to prove the divinity of *Jesus Christ*, *θεους ας το θεος*, where 'tis plain, that, *α θεος* is a nominative instead of a vocative; for the sense is not, *God is thy throne*, but, *thy throne, O God, will remain*, &c.

In fine, that sometimes nominatives are sometimes joined to vocatives, as *Domine Deus meus! Natus meo vires, mea magna potentia solus!* See in the new method of the Latin tongue, the remarks upon the pronouns.

In the French, as also in other vulgar languages, this case is expressed in common nouns, which have

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an article in the nominative, by the suppression of the article; as, *the Lord is my hope*; *Lord, thou art my hope.*

Of the genitive.

The relation of a thing, which in any manner whatsoever belongs to another, has occasioned in those languages, that have cases, a new termination in the nouns, which is called the *genitive*, to express this general relation, which is diversified afterwards into several species, according to the different relations; as,

Of the whole to its parts, *caput hominis.*

Of parts to the whole, *homo crassi capitis.*

Of the subject to the accident or attribute, *color rosæ, misericordia Dei.*

Of the accident to the subject, *puer optimæ indolis.*

Of the efficient cause to the effect, *opus Dei, oratio Ciceronis.*

Of the effect to the cause, *creator mundi.*

Of the final cause to the effect, *potio saporis.*

Of the matter to the compound, *vas auri.*

Of the object to the acts of the soul, *cogitatio belli, contemptus mortis.*

Of the possessor to the thing possessed, *pecus Melibæi, divitiæ Cræsi.*

Of the noun proper to the common, or of the individual to the species, *oppidum Lugduni.*

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And as among these relations there are some opposites, this sometimes occasions equivocal terms. For in these words, *vulnus Achillis*, the genitive *Achillis* may signify either *the relation of the subject*, and then it is taken passively for the wound, which *Achilles* has received; or *the relation of the cause*, and then it is taken actively for the wound which *Achilles* gave. Thus in the following passage of S. Paul, *certus sum, quia neque mors neque vita &c. poterit nos separare a charitate Dei in Christo Jesu Domino nostro*: the genitive *Dei* has been taken in two different senses by Interpreters; for some who give it *the relation of the object*, understand the love, which the elect bear to God in *Jesus Christ*; and others, who give it *the relation of the subject*, understand the love, which God has for the elect in *Jesus Christ*.

Though the Hebrew nouns are not declined by cases, yet the relation expressed by the genitive causes a change in the nouns, but quite different from that of the Greek and Latin. For whereas in these, the change is made in the noun governed, in the Hebrew it is the noun governing. As *דבר שקר* *verbum falsitatis*, where the alteration is not made in *שקר* *falsitas*, but in *דבר* for *דבר* *verbum*.

All the vulgar languages make use of a particle to express the genitive, as *de* in French, *of* in English, *Deus, Dieu, God; Dei, de Dieu, of God.*

What we have said, that the genitive is made use of to mark the relation of the proper to the common noun, or which is the same thing, of the individual to the species, is much more common in the vulgar languages than in Latin. For in Latin the common and proper nouns are frequently put in the same case, which is called Apposition, as *urbs Roma, fluvius Sequana, mons Parnassus.* Whereas in French 'tis usual on these occasions to put the proper name in the genitive, as *la ville de Rome; la riviere de Seine; le mont de Parnasse.*

Of the dative.

There is likewise another relation which is that of the thing, to whose profit or loss other things are related. Those languages, that have cases, express this relation by the word *dative*; which is also used so many other ways, that it is almost impossible to mention them all in particular. *Commodare Socrati, to lend to Socrates; utilis reipublicæ, useful to the republic; perniciosus ecclesiæ, hurtful to the church; promittere amico, to promise to a friend; visum est Platoni, it has seemed good to Plato; affinis regi, related to the king.*

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The vulgar languages have also a particle to express this case, as *a* in French, and *to* in English, as may be seen in the abovementioned examples.

Of the accusative.

The verbs that express actions, which pass from the agent, as *to beat, to break, to beat, to love, to hate*, have subjects, that receive those things, or objects, which they regard. For if a person beats, he beats something; if he loves, he loves something, &c. So that these verbs require after them a noun, to be the subject or object of the action which they signify. Hence, in languages that have cases, nouns assume a new termination, which is called the *accusative*, as *amo Deum, I love God; Cæsar vicit Pompeium, Cæsar overcame Pompey.*

In the French and other vulgar languages there is nothing to distinguish this case from the nominative. But as in these languages the words are generally placed in their natural order, the nominative is easily known from the accusative by being almost always before the verb, as the accusative is known by being after it. *The king loves the queen, the queen loves the king; the king* is the nominative in the first example, and the accusative in the second; and the queen is the accusative in the first, and the nominative in the second.

Of the ablative.

Besides these five cases, the Latins have also a sixth, which was not invented, to point out any particular relation, but only to be joined with some of the particles called *prepositions*. For as those five cases were insufficient to express all the relations, which things have to one another, in all languages they have had recourse to another invention, which is that of contriving little words, to be put before the nouns, from whence they are called *prepositions*: for instance, the relation of a thing, in which another is contained, is expressed in Latin and English by *in*, and in French by *dans*; *vinum est in dolio*, the wine is in the hoghead, *le vin est dans le muid*. Now in the languages, that have cases, these prepositions are not joined with the first form of the noun, which is the nominative, but with some of the other cases. And tho' in Latin there are some, that are joined with the accusative, as *amor erga Deum*, love towards God: yet they have invented a particular case, which is the ablative, to be joined with several other prepositions, from which it is inseparable in the sense; whereas the accusative is frequently separated from its prepositions, as when it follows a verb active, or precedes an infinitive.

This case, properly speaking, is wanting in the plural number, where there is never a termination
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for it, different from that of the dative. But as this would have perplexed the analogy, to say, for instance, that a preposition governs the ablative in the singular, and the dative in the plural, it has therefore been judged more proper to suppose, that the plural number has likewise an ablative, tho always the same with the dative.

For this very reason it is right to allow the Greek nouns an ablative, which is always like the dative; by reason that this preserves a greater analogy between these two languages, which are generally learnt together.

In fine, whenever in French a noun is governed by any kind of preposition, as *il a été puny pour ses crimes*, he has been punished for his crimes: *il a été amené par violence*, he has been carried away by force: *il a passé par Rome*, he passed thro' Rome: *il est sans crime*, he is without a fault: *il est mort devant son père*, he died before his father: we may always say, that it is in the ablative; and this contributes greatly to explain ourselves clearly in several difficulties relating to the pronouns.

C H A P. VII.

Of articles.

TH E indefinite signification of common and appellative nouns, of which we have made mention already chap. 4. has not only occasioned their being put in two sorts of numbers, the singular and the plural, in order to determine it; but moreover has been the cause that in almost all languages they have invented certain particles, called *articles*, which determine the signification in another manner, as well in the singular, as in the plural.

The Latins have no articles; whence *Julius Cæsar Scaliger* falsely concluded in his book of the causes of the Latin tongue, that this particle is useless; tho' we find it of very great service, in rendering the discourse more perspicuous, and avoiding ambiguities.

The Greeks have one article δ , ι , $\tau\delta$. The modern tongues have two; one called the definite, as *le*, *la*, in French, in English, *the*; and the other indefinite, as *un une*, in English *a*.

These

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These articles have properly no cases, no more than the nouns. But that which makes the French article *le*, *the*, seem to have one, is because the genitive and dative are always formed in the plural, and frequently in the singular, by a contraction of the particles *de* and *à*, which are the marks of those two cases, with the plural *les*, and the singular *le*. For in the plural, which is common to the two genders, they always say in the genitive *des* by a contraction of *de les*; *les rois*, *the kings*, *des rois*, instead of *de les rois*, *of the kings*: and in the dative *aux*, *to the*, instead of *à les*; *aux rois*, instead of *à les rois*, *to the kings*; by adding to the contraction the change of *l* into *u*, which is very common in the French; as when of *mal*, *evil*, they make *maux*, *evils*; of *altus*, they make *baut*; of *alnus* *aune*.

The French make use also of the same contraction and of the same change of the *l* into *u*, in the genitive and dative of the singular of the masculine nouns, which begin with a consonant. For they say *du* of *the*, for *de le*; *du roi*, instead of, *de le roi*, of *the king*; *au*, instead of *à le*, *to the*, *au roy*, for *à le roi*, *to the king*. In all the other masculines that begin with a vowel; and in all the feminines in general; the article is left, as it was in the nominative; and *de* is only added for the genitive, and *à* for the dative. *L'état*, *the State*; *de l'état*, of *the state*; *à l'état*, *to the state*. *La vertu*, *the virtue*; *de*

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de la vertu, of the virtue; a la vertu, to the virtue.

As to the other article *un* & *un*, the same as the English *a*, and which the French call indefinite, the general opinion is, that it has no plural. And it really has none that is formed of itself; for we do not say, *uns, unes*; as the Spaniards say, *unos animales*; but I think it has a plural, taken from another word, which is *des* before the substantives, *des animaux*, or *de*, when the adjective goes before, *de beaux lits*, &c. *fine beds*, &c. Or else (which amounts to the same thing) I believe that the particle *des* or *de* oftentimes supplies the same place of the article indefinite in the plural number, as *un* in the singular.

What induces me to think thus, is that in all cases, except the genitive, for a reason which I shall give hereafter, wherever *un* is put in the singular number, *des* ought to be put in the plural, or *de* before the adjectives.

<p>UN crime si horrible merite la mort, So dreadful a crime deserves death.</p>	<p>DES crimes si horribles (or) de si horribles crimes meritent la mort, Crimes so dreadful deserve death.</p>
---	--

Nom.

Gen.

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	<i>Il est coupable</i>	{	<i>D'UN crime horrible,</i>
Gen.	He is guilty		<i>of a horrid crime ;</i>
			<i>DES crimes horribles, (or)</i>
		{	<i>D'horribles crimes,</i>
			<i>of horrid crimes.</i>
	<i>Il a eu recours</i>	{	<i>A UN crime horrible,</i>
Dat.	He has had re-		<i>to a horrid crime ;</i>
	course		<i>A DES crimes horribles, (or)</i>
		{	<i>A D'horribles crimes.</i>
			<i>to horrid crimes.</i>
	<i>Il a commis</i>	{	<i>UN crime horrible,</i>
Acc.	He has com-		<i>a horrid crime ;</i>
	mitted		<i>DES crimes horribles, (or)</i>
		{	<i>D'horribles crimes,</i>
			<i>horrid crimes.</i>
	<i>Il est puny</i>	{	<i>pour UN crime horrible,</i>
Abl.	He is punished		<i>for a horrid crime ;</i>
			<i>pour DES crimes horribles,</i>
		{	<i>(or) pour D'horribles crimes,</i>
			<i>for horrid crimes.</i>

Observe here, that they add *à*, which is the dative particle, in order to form the dative of this article, as well in the singular, *à un*, as in the plural, *à des*: And that they also add *de*, which is the genitive particle, to form the genitive singular, *viz. d'un*. It is therefore manifest, that, according to this analogy, the genitive plural ought to be formed in the same

same manner, by adding *de*, to *des*, or *de*; but that this has not been followed for a reason, which constitutes the greatest part of the irregularities of all languages, that is, to avoid displeasing the ear. For *de des*, and much more *de de*, would have offended the ear, which could hardly suffer the sound of *il est accusé de des crimes horribles*, or *il est accusé de de grands crimes*. Hence according to the expression of an ancient writer, *Impetratum est a ratione, ut peccare suavitatis causa liceret*.

This shews that *des* is sometimes the genitive plural of the French article *le*; as when we say, *le Sauveur des hommes*, the Saviour of men, instead of, *de les hommes*: and sometimes the nominative, or the accusative, or the ablative, or the dative, of the plural number of the article *un*, as we have just now demonstrated. And moreover that *de* is sometimes the simple mark of the genitive without an article, as when we say; *ce sont des festins de roy*, these are kingly feasts; and sometimes, either the genitive plural of the same article, *un*, instead of *de des*; or the other cases of the same article before the adjectives, according to what has been already observed.

We have mentioned in general, that the use of the articles is to determine the signification of the common nouns; but it is a difficult matter to point out precisely, what this determination consists in,

D

because

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because the practice is not alike in all languages, that have articles. The following remarks may be of use in regard to the French.

The common noun, as *roy*, king,

without an article,	either has only a very confused signification,	<i>Il a fait un festin de roy,</i> He has feasted like a king. <i>Ils ont fait des festins de rois,</i> They have feasted like kings.
	or has a signification determined by the subject of the proposition.	<i>Louis XIV. est roy,</i> Lewis XIV. is king. <i>Louis XIV. & Philippe V. sont rois,</i> Lewis XIV. and Philip V. are kings.
with the article <i>le</i> it signifies either	The species in its full extent,	<i>Le Roy ne depend point de ses sujets,</i> A king does not depend on his subjects. <i>Les rois ne dependent point de leurs sujets.</i> Kings do not depend on their subjects.

or

		<i>Le roy a fait la paix,</i>
		The king has con-
		cluded a peace,
		<i>viz. Lewis XIV.</i>
		by reason of the
		circumstances
		of the time.
	or one or	
	several indi-	
	viduals de-	
	termined by	
	the circum-	<i>Les rois ont fondé les</i>
	stances of	<i>principales ab-</i>
	him that	<i>bayes de France,</i>
	speaks, or	The kings have found-
	of the dis-	ed the chief ab-
	course.	beys in <i>France,</i>
		<i>viz. the French</i>
		kings.

With the article	<i>un</i> in	it signifies	one or several	unde- ter- min'd indi- vidu- als.	<i>Un roy détruira Con-</i>
	the				<i>stantinople.</i>
	fin-				A king shall destroy
	gu-				Constantino-
	lar,				ple.
	<i>des</i>				<i>Rome a été gouvernée</i>
	or <i>de</i>				<i>par des rois</i> (or)
	in				<i>par de grands</i>
	the				<i>rois,</i>
	plu-				<i>Rome</i> has been go-
	ral.				verned by
					kings, or by
					great kings.

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We see by this that the article ought not to be joined to proper names; because as these signify a single and determined thing, they have no occasion for the determination of the article.

And yet as custom and reason often differ, the article is sometimes used in Greek, even with the proper names of men, as *ὁ Φίλιππος*. The Italians frequently use it in the same manner, *L'Aristo, Il Tasso, L'Aristotele*: which the French sometimes imitate in names that are purely Italian, but in none else, saying for instance, *L'Arioste, Le Tasse*; whereas they don't say, *L'Aristote, Le Platon*. For they never add articles to the proper names of men, unless it be in contempt: or in speaking of low people, *le tel, la telle, such a one*: or when of appellatives or common they are become proper; thus, there are men whose names are, *le Roy, le Maitre, le Clerc*. But in this case the whole is regarded as one word; infomuch that when those names are given to women, the article *le* is never changed into *la*, but a woman signs her name, *Marie le Roi, Marie le Maitre, &c.*

Neither are articles used, when speaking of proper names of towns or villages, *Paris, Rome, Milan, Gentilly*, except some French names, which of appellatives are become proper, as *la Capelle, le Plessis, le Castelet*.

Not

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Nor for the generality, when mentioning the names of churches, which are simply denominated by the name of the Saint, to whom they are dedicated, *S. Peter, S. Paul, S. John.*

But in French they are added to proper names of kingdoms and provinces: as, *la France, l'Espagne, la Picardie, &c.* Tho' there are some names of countries that have them not: as, *Cornuailles, Comminges, Roannez.*

The French use them with the names of rivers, *la Seine, le Rhine*; which is practised likewise in English.

As also of mountains, *l'Olympe, le Parnasse.*

In fine, 'tis observable that the article does not agree with the adjectives, because these must take their determination from the substantive. And if it is sometimes used with the adjective, as when we say, *the white, the red*, 'tis because they are then made substantives, *the white* being the same thing as *whiteness*; or because the substantive is understood, as when in mentioning wine, we say, *I would rather have the white.*



C H A P. VIII.

Of pronouns.

AS men are obliged to mention frequently the same things in discourse, and it would have been troublesome to repeat always the same nouns; they have invented certain words to supply the places of those nouns, and which are therefore called *pronouns*.

In the first place they perceived, that it was often needless and indecent to name themselves: Hence they introduced the pronoun of the first person, to supply the name of the person that speaks: *Ego, I.*

On the other hand to avoid naming the person to whom we speak, it has been judged proper to distinguish him by a word, which they call the pronoun of the second person, *tu, thou, or vos, ye.*

Again, to avoid the too frequent repetition of the names of other persons, or of other things, of which we discourse, the pronouns of the third person were invented, as *ille, illa, illud, he, she, that, &c.* And of these some point out

as

as it were with the finger, the thing spoken of, and for that reason are called demonstratives; as *hic, iste.*

There is also one that is called reciprocal, that is, which reflects back on it self, and is, *sui, sibi, se, himself.* *Peter loves himself; Cato killed himself.*

As these pronouns perform the office of other nouns, so they have the same properties: As

Numbers, singular and plural: I, we; thou, ye, you: but in French, as also in most modern languages, the second person plural is put instead of the singular, even when we speak to a single person: *vous etes un homme de promesse: you are a man of your word.*

Genders, he, she, but the pronoun of the first person is always common: and that of the second also, except it be in the Hebrew, and the languages that imitate it, where the masculine אָנִי is distinguished from the feminine אֲנִי

Cases, Ego, mei; I, of me. And we have already observed, that the languages, which have no cases in their nouns, have them frequently in their pronouns.

This is manifest in the French language, where the pronouns may be considered according to the three different uses pointed out in the following table.

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Before the verbs in the			Every where else.	
Nom.	Dat.	Acc.	Abl.	Gen. &c.
<i>Je</i> , I. <i>nous</i> , we.	<i>me</i> , me.		<i>moy</i> , me.	
<i>tu</i> , thou. <i>vous</i> , ye.	<i>te</i> , thee.		<i>toy</i> , thee.	
	<i>se</i> , himself, or herself.		<i>soy</i> , himself, or herself.	
<i>il</i> , he; <i>elle</i> , she.	<i>lui</i> , him, her.	<i>le</i> , <i>la</i> , him, her.	<i>luy</i> , him; <i>elle</i> , her.	
<i>ils</i> , <i>elles</i> , they.	<i>leur</i> , them.	<i>les</i> , them.	<i>eux</i> , them; <i>elles</i> , them.	

But we have some remarks to make upon this table.

The 1. is, that in order to abbreviate, we have put *nous* and *vous*, *we* and *ye*, no more than once, tho' they are every where used before the verbs, after the verbs, and in all cases. Wherefore in common discourse in French, the pronoun of the second person can occasion no difficulty, because the custom is to use only *vous*. The

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The 2. is, that the word which we have marked as the dative and the accusative of the pronoun *il* when before the verbs, is put also after the verbs if they are in the Imperative, *Vous luy dites*, you tell him; *Dites-luy*, tell him. *Vous leur dites*, you tell them; *dites-leur*, tell them. *Vous le menez*, you lead him; *menez le*, lead him. *Vous la conduisez*, you conduct her; *conduisez-la*, conduct her. But *me*, *te*, *se*, are never used except before the verb. *Vous me parlez*, you speak to me. *Vous me menez*, you conduct me. Hence it is that when the verb is in the imperative, *moy* must be used instead of *me*. *Parlez moy*: speak to me. *Menez moy*, lead me. *Monf. de Vaugelas* seems not to have attended to this; for inquiring into the reason, why we say *menez l'y*, lead him thither, while we are not permitted to say, *menez m'y*, lead me thither; he finds no other reason for it, but its being disagreeable to the ear. But since it is certain that we cannot apostrophe the word *moy*; to authorize us to say, *menez m'y*, we should be permitted to say, *menez-me*: as we say *menez l'y*, because we can say *menez le*. Now *menez-me* is not French, and consequently *menez-m'y* is not French.

The 3. remark is, that when the French pronouns are before the verbs, or after the verbs, in the imperative, the particle *à* is omitted in the dative. *Vous me donnez*, you give me; *donnez-moy*,
D 5 give

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give me, and not *donnez à moy*, give me. Except when the pronoun is repeated, in which case *même* is commonly added, which is never joined to pronouns but in the third form. *Dites le moy à moy*, tell it to me: *Je vous le donne à vous*, I give it to you: *Il me le promet à moy-même*, he promises it to me. *Dites leur à eux-mêmes*, tell it to them: *trompez la elle-même*, deceive her: *dites lui à elle-même*, tell it to her.

The 4. is, that in the pronoun *il*, the nominative *il* or *elle*, and the accusative, *le* or *la*, are applied indiscriminately to all sorts of things; whereas the dative, the ablative, the genitive, and the pronoun, *son*, *sa*, which supplies the place of the genitive, ought commonly to be applied to persons only.

Thus 'tis very well to say of a country house, *elle est belle*, *Je la rendray belle*, it is pretty, I will make it pretty: but it is bad French to say, *Je luy ay adjouté un pavillon*: *Je ne puis vivre sans elle*: *c'est pour L'amour d'elle que Je quitte souvent la ville*: *sa situation me plaît*. I have added a pavillon to her: I cannot live without her: 'tis for her sake I frequently quit the town: her situation pleases me. In good French we must say, *J'y ay adjouté un pavillon*: *Je ne puis vivre sans cela*, or, *sans le divertissement que J'y prens*: *Elle est cause, que Je quitte souvent la ville*: *la situation m'en plaît*. I have added a pavillon to it: I cannot live without it,

or without the pleasure I receive there: It induces me oftentimes to quit the town: Its situation is agreeable to me.

I am not ignorant, that this rule is liable to exceptions. For 1. words, which signify a multitude, as *eglise, church; peuple, people; compagnie, company*, are not subject to it.

2. When things are animated, and considered as persons, by a figure called *Prosopopæia*, it is then allowed to make use of terms agreeable to persons.

3. Spiritual things, as *la volonté, the will; la vertu, virtue, la vérité, truth*, admit of personal expressions; and I don't think it is bad French to say: *L'amour de Dieu a ses mouvements, ses desirs, ses joyes, aussi bien que l'amour du monde: J'aime uniquement la vérité; J'ay des ardeurs pour elle, que Je ne puis exprimer. The love of God has its movements, its desires, its joys, as well as the love of the world: I love the truth only, I have a passion for it, that I cannot express.*

4. Custom has authorised the making use of the French pronoun *son*, in things, which are intirely proper or essential to other things mentioned in discourse. Thus we say, *une riviere est sortie de son lit, a river has overflown its bed: un cheval a rompu sa bride, a mangé son avoine, a horse has broke his bridle, has eat his oats*: because oats are considered as a nourishment absolutely proper for a

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horse: we say likewise, *chaque chose suit l'instinct de sa nature; chaque chose doit être en son lieu; une maison est tombée d'elle-mesme: Every thing follows the instinct of its nature; every thing ought to be in its place: a house is fallen of itself: nothing being more essential to a thing, than that which constitutes it such. This makes me imagine, that this rule ought not to take place in scientific discourses, where we speak only of what is proper or essential to things: consequently that we may say of a word, sa signification principale est telle, its principal signification is such; and of a triangle: son plus grand côté est celui, qui soutient son plus grand angle; &c.*

There may still be some other difficulties raised in objection to this rule: but I have not examined it sufficiently, to be able to give an account of all that can be said against it. This however is certain, that to speak French correctly the above rule ought to be minded; and to neglect it, is a very great fault, except in phrases authorised by custom, or for some other particular reason. And yet Monf. de Vaugelas has taken no notice of it; but he has mentioned another very like it, concerning the *qui, who*, which ought to be applied only to persons; except the nominative, and its accusative *que*.

Hitherto

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Hitherto we have explained the principal and primitive pronouns: but there are others formed from thence, which are called possessives; in the same manner as we observed, that there are adjectives formed from nouns which signify substances, by adding a confused signification to them; as from the Latin *terra*, *terrestris*. Thus *meus*, *mine*, signifies distinctly *me*, and confusedly something that belongs to me. *Meus liber*, *my book*, that is, *the book of me*, just as the Greeks generally express it, βιβλὸς μου.

There are some of these pronouns in French, which are always joined to a noun without an article, *mon*, *ton*, *son*, and the plural, *nos*, *vos*: others which are always joined to an article without a noun; *mien*, *tien*, *sien*, and the plural *nôtres*, *vôtres*. And there are some that are used both ways, *nôtre* & *vôtre* in the singular, *leur* & *leurs*. There is no occasion for examples, as the thing is plain: I shall only observe, that this has been the reason for rejecting the following old way of speaking, *un mien amy*, *un mien parent*, *a friend of mine*, *a relation of mine*; because the word *mien*, *mine*, ought never to be used but with the article *le*, and without a noun. *C'est le mien*, *'tis mine*: *Ce sont les nôtres*, *they are ours*, &c.

his language is here explained the preceding
 relative pronouns: but there are others formed

C H A P IX.

Of the pronoun called relative.

THERE remains still another pronoun called relative, *qui, quæ, quod, who, or which.*

This pronoun relative has something common with other pronouns, and something particular.

It has something common in this, that it is used instead of a noun, and even more generally than all the other pronouns, being put for all persons. *I, who am a Christian: Thou, who art a Christian: He, who is a King,*

What it has particular, may be considered in two different manners.

The 1. is, that it always has a relation to another noun or pronoun called the antecedent; as, *God who is holy: God* is the antecedent of the relative *who*. But this antecedent is sometimes understood and not expressed, especially in Latin, as may be seen in the new method of learning the Latin tongue.

The 2. thing particular to the relative, and which I don't remember to have ever seen observed,

is,

is, that the proposition into which it enters, (and which may be called accessory) may constitute part of the subject, or of the attribute of another proposition, which may be called principal.

This cannot be rightly understood, without recollecting what has been mentioned already in the commencement of this discourse: that in every proposition there is a subject, namely, that of which something is affirmed; and an attribute, that which is affirmed of something. But these two terms may be either simple, as when I say, *God is good*; or complex, as when I say, *an able magistrate is a man useful to the republic*. For that, of which I affirm in this last proposition, is not only *a magistrate*, but *an able magistrate*. And what I affirm, is, that not only he is a man, but moreover, *that he is a man useful to the republic*. See what has been said on complex propositions, in the logic or art of thinking, part. 2. chap. 3. 4. 5. and 6.

This union of several terms in the subject and the attribute, is sometimes of such a nature, as not to hinder the proposition from being simple, when it contains no more than one judgment or affirmation, as when I say: *the valour of Achilles has been the cause of the taking of Troy*. Which always happens when of the two substantives, that enter into the subject or attribute of the proposition, one is governed by the other.

But

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But at other times these propositions, whose subject or attribute are composed of several terms, include at least in the mind, several judgments, out of which so many propositions may be formed: as when I say; *the invisible God has created the visible world*; there are three judgments formed in my mind, all included in this proposition. For 1. I judge that *God is invisible*. 2. That *he has created the world*. 3. That *the world is visible*. And of those three propositions, the second is the principal and essential. But the first and third are accessory ones, which form but a part of the principal, the first constituting the subject, and the last the attribute.

Now these accessory propositions are frequently in the mind, without being expressed, as in the abovementioned example. But sometimes they are distinctly marked, and therein consists the use of the relative: As when I reduce the said example to these terms: *God who is invisible has created the world, which is visible*.

The property therefore of the relative consists in this, that the proposition, into which it enters, shall constitute a part of the subject, or of the attribute of another proposition.

But here we must observe; First, that when two nouns are joined together, one of which is not governed, but only is in concord with the other,
either

either by apposition, as *urbs Roma*, or as an adjective, as *Deus sanctus*; especially if this adjective be a participle, *canis currens*: all these forms of speech include the relative in the sense, and may be resolved by the relative: *Urbs quæ dicitur Roma, Deus qui est sanctus, Canis qui currit.* And it depends on the genius of languages to make use of either manner. Thus we find that in Latin the participle is generally used; *video canem currentem*; and in French the relative, *Je voy un chien qui court.*

Secondly, I have said that the proposition of the relative may make *part* of the subject or of the attribute of another proposition, which may be called the principal. For it never makes the intire subject, nor the intire attribute: but we must join with it the word, whose place the relative supplies, in order to make the subject intire, and some other word to make an intire attribute. For instance, when I say, *God who is invisible, is the creator of the world which is visible.* *Who is invisible* is not the intire subject of this proposition, but we must add *God*: And *which is visible* is not the whole attribute, but we must join *the world*.


Thirdly, the relative may be also either the subject or part of the attribute of the accessory proposition. To be the subject, it must be in the nominative case, *qui creavit mundum; qui sanctus est.*

But

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But when it happens to be in an oblique case, the genitive, dative, accusative: then it does not constitute the entire attribute of this accessory proposition, but only a part: *Deus quem amo, God whom I love.* The subject of the proposition is *ego*, and the verb makes the connexion and a part of the attribute, of which *quem* makes another part; as if it were, *ego amo quem*, or *ego sum amans quem*. And in like manner; *cujus cælum sedes est*: Which is just as if one were to say: *cælum est sedes cujus*.

And yet even on these occasions, the relative is always placed at the head of the proposition (tho according to the sense it ought only to be at the end) unless it happens to be governed by a proposition. For the preposition generally precedes: *Dei in quo mundus est conditus, God by whom the world was created.*



The sequel of the same Chapter :

*Several grammatical difficulties explained by
means of this principle.*

WHAT we have observed of the double use of the relative; one of its being a pronoun, and the other of its marking the union of one proposition with another, helps to clear up several obscure points, which have hitherto puzzled the Grammarians.

I shall reduce them to three classes, and of each I shall lay down examples.

The first when the relative is visibly put for a conjunction and a pronoun demonstrative.

The second, when it stands only for a conjunction.

And the third, when it supplies the place of a pronoun demonstrative, and does not partake of the nature of a conjunction.

The relative is put for a conjunction and a demonstrative, when *Livy*, for example, says of *Junius Brutus*, *Is quum primores civitatis, in quibus fratrem suum ab avunculo interfectum, audisset.* For it is visible that, *in quibus*, stands there instead of *& in his*. Insomuch that this passage is very clear and intelligible if it be thus reduced. *Quum primores*

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trimores civitatis & in his fratrem suum interfectum audisset. Now without our principle it is almost impossible to resolve it.

But the relative sometimes loses its demonstrative force, and only performs the part of a conjunction.

This we may consider on two different occasions.

The first is a manner of speaking very common in Hebrew, when the relative is not the subject of the proposition into which it enters, but only a part of the attribute: as when we say, *pulvis quem projicit ventus*: the Hebrews here allow the relative no more than the second use, which is that of marking the union of the proposition with another; and as to the first use, which is that of supplying the place of a noun, they express it by the pronoun demonstrative, as if there were no relative at all: thus they say, *quem projicit eum ventus*. These expressions have passed into the new testament, where S. Peter alluding to a passage of *Isaiab*, says of *Jesus Christ*, ὃ τῷ μώλωπι αὐτοῦ ἰάθητε, *cujus livore ejus sanati estis*. Grammarians for want of rightly distinguishing these two uses of the relative, have been unable to account for this manner of speaking, so that they have been obliged to call it a *Plæonasm*; that is an useless superfluity.

But we have examples of this even in the very best Latin writers, where the grammarians have been greatly

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greatly at a loss. *Livy*, for instance, expresses himself thus: *M. Flavius Tribunus plebis, tulit ad populum, ut in Tusculanos animadverteretur, quorum ope ac consilio Veliterni populo Romano bellum fecissent*, Where it is so very visible that *quorum* performs only the office of a conjunction, that some have been of opinion, that we ought to read it, *quod eorum ope*: But the first reading is authorised by the best editions, and the most ancient manuscripts: *Plautus* also expresses himself in the same manner in his *Trinummus*, where he says;

*Inter eos ne homines condalium te redipisci postulas,
Quorum eorum unus surripuit currenti cursori solum?*

Where *quorum* has entirely the same force, as if it were *Cum eorum unus surripuerit*, &c.

The second thing that may be explained by this principle, is the celebrated dispute among the grammarians, concerning the nature of the Latin *quod* after a verb: as when *Cicero* says: *non tibi objicio quod hominem spoliasti*; which we meet with more frequently among the authors *infimæ latinitatis*, who generally express by *quod*, what might with more elegance be put in the infinitive. *Dico quod tellus est rotunda* instead of *dico tellurem esse rotundam*. Some pretend that this *quod* is an adverb or conjunction; and others that it is the neuter of the relative *qui*, *quæ*, *quod*.

But

For my part, I really think, it is the relative, which has always a reference to an antecedent (as we have already observed) but is deprived of its pronominal use; having nothing in its signification, that can constitute a part either of the subject or of the attribute of an accessory proposition; and retaining only its second use of uniting the proposition in which it is to another, as we have just now remarked with regard to the Hebrew, *quem projicit eum ventus*. For in this passage of Cicero, *non tibi objicio quòd hominem spoliasti*; these last words, *hominem spoliasti*, form a complete proposition, to which the preceding *quòd* makes no addition, nor does it supply the place of a noun: all it does, is, to make this same proposition, to which it is joined, form only a part of the intire proposition: *Non tibi objicio quòd hominem spoliasti*: whereas without the *quòd*, it would subsist by itself, and constitute singly a proposition.

This same explication may be also given, when treating of the infinitive of the verbs, where we shall prove it to be the right manner of resolving the particle answering to *quòd* in the modern languages; as when we say, *I suppose that you will become wiser*; *I tell you, that you are in the wrong*. For here the word *that*, which answers to the Latin *quòd*, is divested of the nature of a pronoun, so as to perform only the office of a conjunction, which
shews

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shews that these propositions, *you will become wiser, you are in the wrong*, form no more than a part of the intire propositions, *I suppose, &c. I tell you, &c.*

We have now pointed out two instances in which the relative divested of its pronominal use, retains only that of joining two propositions. But we may also, on the contrary, observe two other occasions, in which the relative loses its use of a conjunction, and retains only that of a pronoun. The first is a manner of speaking, wherein the Latins frequently employ the relative, by giving it scarce any thing more than the force of a pronoun demonstrative, and leaving it very little of its other use, which is that of connecting the proposition, in which it is employed, to another proposition. Hence it is, that they begin so many periods with the relative, which cannot be rendered into the vulgar languages, without employing the pronoun demonstrative; because the force of the relative, as a conjunction, being almost intirely lost in the original, it would seem odd to make use of one in the translation. For instance, *Pliny* thus begins his panegyric: *Bene ac sapienter, P. C. majores instituerunt, ut verum agendarum, ita dicendi initium a precationibus capere, quod nihil ritè, nihilque providenter homines sine decorum immortalium ope, consilio, honore, auspicerentur. Qui mos, etiam potius quam consuli, aut quando magis usurpandus colendusque est?*

Certain

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Certain it is, that this *qui*, rather begins a new period, than connects this last to that which went before; and for this it is preceded by a full stop. Wherefore translating this passage, we should not say: *which custom*, but *this custom*, beginning the second period thus: *And by whom ought this custom to be more observed, than by a Consul?*

Cicero abounds in the like examples, as Orat. 5. in Verrem. *Itaque alii cives Romani ne cognoscerentur, capitibus obvolutis a carcere ad palum, atque ad necem rapiabantur: alii cum a multis civibus Romanis recognoscerentur, ab omnibus defenderentur, securi fiebantur. Quorum Ego de acerbissimâ morte, crudelissimoque cruciatu dicam, cum eum locum tractare cæpero.* This *quorum* ought to be translated, as if it were *de illorum morte*.

The other instance in which the relative retains scarce any thing more than its pronominal use, is in the Greek *ὅτι*, the nature of which was never perfectly examined into as I know of, before the publishing of the Greek Method. For although this particle frequently bears a very great relation to the Latin *quod*, and is taken from the pronoun relative of the Greek language, as *quod* is from the Latin relative; yet there is oftentimes this remarkable difference between the nature of *quod* and of *ὅτι*; that whereas this Latin particle is no more than the relative divested of its office of a pronoun,

noun, and retaining only that of a conjunction: the Greek particle on the contrary is frequently stript of its use of a conjunction, and retains only that of a pronoun. Concerning which, see the New Latin Method, remarks on the adverbs, n. 4. and the New Greek Method, book 8. chap. 11. Thus, for instance, when in the book of Revelations, chap. iii. *Jesus Christ* in reproving a bishop, who had some conceit of himself, says to him, Λέγεις ὅτι πλούσιός εἰμι, *dicis quòd dives sum*, the meaning is not, *quòd ego qui ad te loquor dives sum*; but *dicis hoc*, you say this, *viz. dives sum*, I am rich. Hence there are two speeches, or separate propositions, the second of which is no part of the first; so that ὅτι officiates here neither as a relative nor as a conjunction. This seems to have been copied from the Hebrews, as we shall more particularly observe chap. 17. and is very proper to be taken notice of, in order to resolve several difficult propositions in the Greek tongue.

C H A P. X.

*Examination of a rule of the French language;
which is, that the relative ought not to be
placed after a noun without an article.*

MY motive for examining this rule, is the opportunity it affords me of touching upon several things of importance relating to the rational knowledge of languages, which would oblige me to be too prolix, were I to treat of them each in particular.

Monf. de *Vaugelas* is the first, who published this rule, among several other very judicious ones, with which his remarks are interspersed: *viz.* that the relative *qui*, *who*, or *which*, ought never to be put after a noun without an article. Thus it is very well to say; *il a été traité avec violence*, *he has been treated with violence*: but if I want to signify, that this violence was very inhuman, I cannot do it without joining the article; *Il a été traité avec une violence qui a été tout-à-fait inhumaine*, *he has been treated with a violence that was absolutely inhuman.*

This

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This seems at first sight very reasonable: but as there are several expressions in French, which do not appear quite conformable to this rule; for instance, *Il agit en politique qui sçait gouverner*, he acts like a politician who understands the art of government. *Il est coupable de crimes, qui meritent chatiment*, he is guilty of crimes that are deserving of punishment. *Il n'y a homme qui sçache cela*, there is not a man that knows it. *Seigneur, qui voyez ma misere, assistez-moy*, Lord, who seest my misery, assist me. *Une sorte de bois qui est fort dur*, a sort of wood that is very hard: with several others.

I have therefore considered, whether the said rule might not be expressed in terms, which would render it more general, and at the same time would shew, that these and such like expressions, tho' seemingly contrary to it, are not so in reality. Perhaps the following manner of expressing it is more exact.

In the present use of the French tongue, *qui* ought never to be put after a common noun, unless it be determined by an article, or by something else that can determine it as well as an article.

That this may be rightly comprehended, we must remember that two things may be distinguished in the common noun, the signification, which is fixed, (for it is by accident it changes sometimes, as by amphibology or by metaphor) and the extent

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of this signification, which is liable to vary, according as the noun is taken either for the whole species, or for a certain or uncertain part.

It is only with regard to this extent, that we say, a noun common is *undetermined*, when there is nothing that expresses, whether it ought to be taken generally or particularly; and when it is taken particularly, whether it be for a certain or uncertain particular. On the contrary we say, a noun is determined, when there is something which marks its determination. Hence it is manifest that by the word *determined*, we do not mean *restrained*; since according to what we have just now observed, a noun common ought to pass for *determined*, when there is something which denotes, that it ought to be taken in its full extent: as in this proposition; *Tout homme est raisonnable*, every man is reasonable.

And here lies the foundation of this rule. For we may make use of a common noun, only regarding its signification; as in the abovementioned example, *Il a été traité avec violence*, he has been used with violence; and then there is no occasion for determining it: But if I have a mind to say something particular, which is done by adding the particle *qui*, *which*; it is but reasonable, that in those languages, which have articles to determine the extent of the common nouns, they should be used

on

on this occasion; to the end that we may the better understand what this *qui*, *which*, ought to relate to, whether to the whole that may be implied by the common noun, or only to a certain or uncertain part.

But we see also by this, that as the article is necessary on these occasions, only to determine the common noun; if it happens to be otherwise determined, the relative *qui*, *which*, may be added, as if there had been an article. This shews the necessity of expressing this rule in the manner we have done, in order to render it general; it shews also, that almost all the expressions, which seem contrary, are rather conformable to it; by reason that the noun which is without an article, is determined by something else. When I say *by something else*, I do not mean the *qui*, *which*, that is joined with it. For if this were to be understood, one could never trespass against this rule, because it might always be said, that a *qui*, *which*, is never used after a noun without an article, but in a determinate way of speaking, because it would have been determined by the *qui*, *which*, itself.

To account therefore for almost all that can be objected against this rule, we have only to consider the different manners, by which a noun without an article may be determined.

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1. It is certain that as proper names signify only a single thing, they are determined of themselves; for which reason I have mentioned in the rule only common nouns, it being unquestionably good language to say; *Il imite Virgile, qui est le premier des poëtes, he imitates Virgil, who is the prince of poets. Tout ma confiance est en Jesus Christ, qui m'a racheté, all my confidence is in Jesus Christ, who has redeemed me.*

2. Vocatives are also determined by the very nature of the vocative; so that there is no occasion for an article, in order to join a *qui*, which, with it; since it is the suppression of the article that renders them vocatives, and distinguishes them from the nominative. It is not therefore contrary to rule to say: *Ciel, qui connoissez mes maux, heaven, that knowest my misfortunes. Soleil, qui voyez toutes choses, sun, that seest all things.*

3. *Ce, quelque, plusieurs, this, some, many,* numeral nouns, as *deux & trois, two and three, &c. tout, nul, aucun, &c. all, none, any, &c.* determine, as well as the articles. This is too clear to require any proof.

4. In negative propositions, the terms on which the negation falls, are determined to be taken generally by the very negation itself, whose property it is to take all away. For this reason we say affirmatively with the article: *Il a de l'argent,*
du

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du cœur, de la charité, de l'ambition, he has money, courage, charity, ambition; and negatively without the article, Il n'a point d'argent, de cœur, de charité, d'ambition, he has no money, no courage, no charity, no ambition. And hereby it appears also, that the following expressions are not contrary to the rule: *Il n'y a point d'injustice qu'il ne commette, there is no injustice which he does not commit. Il n'y a homme qui sçache cela, there is never a man that knows this.* Nor even this other, *Est-il ville dans le royaume qui soit plus obeissante? Is there a town in the kindgom that is more obedient?* Because an affirmative interrogation is in its signification resolvab'e into a negation. *Il n'y a point de ville, qui soit plus obeissante, there is no town, that is more obedient.*

5. It is a rule of logic, that in affirmative propositions the subject attracts the attribute to itself, that is, determines it. Hence the following ratiocination is false: *Man is an animal; an ape is an animal; therefore an ape is a man.* Because *animal* being the attribute in the two first propositions, the two different subjects are determined to two different sorts of *animals*. For which reason it is not against the rule to say, *Je suis homme qui parle franchement, I am a man that talks freely;* because *man* is determined by *I*: which is so far true; that the verb, which in French follows *qui*, is better in the first person than in the third. *Je suis homme*

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qui ay bien vû des choses, I am a man, who have seen a great many things, rather than, qui a bien vû des choses, who has seen a great many things.

6. The words, *sorte, espece, genre, sort, species, kind, and such like*, determine those that follow them; which for this very reason ought to have no article. *Une sorte de fruit, a kind of fruit, and not d'un fruit, of a fruit.* Hence 'tis right to say; *une sorte de fruit qui est meur en hyver, a kind of fruit that is ripe in winter. Une espece de bois qui est fort dur, a kind of wood that is very hard.*

7. The French particle *en*, taken in the same sense as the Latin *ut, vivit ut rex, il vit en roy*, includes the article, being equivalent to *comme un roy, en la maniere d'un roy, as a king, like a king.* Wherefore 'tis not contrary to the rule to say: *Il agit en roy qui sçait regner, he acts as a king that knows how to rule. Il parle en homme qui sçait faire ses affaires, he talks like a man that knows how to manage his affairs: that is, comme un roy, as a king; or, comme un homme, as a man, &c.*

8. *De* alone with a plural, is frequently used instead of *des*, which is the plural of the article *un*, as we have made appear when treating of the article. Hence the following expressions are very right, and no ways contrary to the rule. *Il est accablé de maux qui lui font perdre patience, he is oppressed with hardships which make him lose all patience.*

patience. Il est chargé de dettes qui vont au dela de son bien, he is loaded with debts which exceed his fortune.

9. Whether the following expressions be in other respects good or bad, *c'est grêle qui tombe, 'tis hail that falls. Ce sont gens habiles qui m'ont dit cela, they are clever people, who told me this*; they are not contrary to the rule: because the *qui* does not relate to the noun without an article, but to *ce*, which is of all genders and numbers. For the noun without article, *grele, hail, gens habiles, clever people*, is what I affirm, and consequently the attribute; and the *qui* makes part of the subject of which I affirm. For I affirm *de ce qui tombe, of that which falls, that c'est de la grele, 'tis hail: de ceux qui m'ont dit cela, of those who told me this, that ce sont des gens habiles, they are clever people.* As the *qui* therefore does not relate to the noun without an article, it does not interfere at all with this rule.

If there are other expressions in French, which still may seem contrary to the rule, and which all these observations cannot reconcile; they must, I think, be the remains of the old language, which used almost generally to omit the articles. Now there is a maxim, which those who undertake to write of a living language ought always to remember; namely, that the forms of speech, authorized by a general and uncontested practice, ought to be looked

upon as legitimate, tho' they be contrary to the rules and analogy of the language : but that they ought not to be alledged with a view of contesting the rules and perplexing the analogy, nor of drawing inferences to authorize other phrases and expressions not sufficiently established by custom. So that to regard nothing else but the irregularities of custom, without observing this maxim, is the way to render a language always uncertain, and to leave it without principles by which it might be ascertained.



C H A P. XI.

Of prepositions.

WE have already observed, chap. 6. that cases and prepositions were invented for the same use, that is, to express the relations which things have to one another.

The relations signified by prepositions are very near the same in all languages. I shall content myself therefore with giving here the chief of those, that are marked by the prepositions of the French tongue, without confining myself to an exact enumeration, as it would be requisite in a particular grammar.

The

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The chief of these relations may be reduced, I think, to the following.

Of place, of si- tuati- on, of or- der,	dans in	<i>Il est dans Paris, he is in Paris.</i>
	en, in	<i>Il est en Italie, he is in Italy.</i>
	a, at	<i>Il est a Rome, he is at Rome.</i>
	hors, out of	<i>Cette maison est hors la ville, this house is out of town.</i>
	sur or sus, upon,	<i>Il est sur la mer, he is upon, or, at sea.</i>
	sous, under,	<i>Tout ce qui est sous le ciel, whatever is under heaven.</i>
	devant, before,	<i>Un tel marchoit devant le roy, such a one walked before the king.</i>
	apres, after, be- hind,	<i>Un tel marchoit après le roy, such a one walked af- ter, behind the king.</i>
	chez, at one's house, or with	<i>Il est chez le roy, he is with the king.</i>

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Of time,	{	<i>avant</i> , before, <i>avant la guerre</i> , before the war.
		<i>pendant</i> , during, <i>pendant la guerre</i> , during the war.
		<i>depuis</i> , since, <i>depuis la guerre</i> , since the war.

Of the term de- noting	{	motion to a place,	{	<i>en</i> , into, <i>Il va en Italie</i> , he is going to Italy,
		<i>a</i> , to, <i>a Rome</i> , to Rome.		
		<i>vers</i> , to-wards, <i>L'aimant se tourne vers le nord</i> , the loadstone turns towards the North.		
	{	motion from a place	{	<i>envers</i> , towards, <i>Son amour envers Dieu</i> , his love towards God.
		<i>de</i> , from, <i>Il part de Paris</i> , he sets out from Paris.		

Of the cause,	{	efficient,	{	<i>par</i> , by, <i>Maison batie par un architecte</i> , a house built by an architect.
		material,		<i>de</i> , of, <i>De pierre & de brique</i> , of stone and brick.
		final,		<i>pour</i> , to, <i>Pour y loger</i> , to lodge there.

Other

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Other rela- tions of	union: <i>avec</i> , with,	<i>Les soldats avec leurs offi- ciers, the soldiers with their officers.</i>
	separation: <i>sans</i> , without,	<i>Les soldats sans leurs offi- ciers, the soldiers without their officers.</i>
	exception: <i>ou- tre</i> , besides,	<i>Compagnie de cent soldats outre les officiers, com- pany of a hundred soldiers besides the of- ficers.</i>
	opposition: <i>con- tre</i> , against,	<i>Soldats revoltex contre leurs officiers, soldiers re- volted against their officers.</i>
	expulsion: <i>du</i> , from, out,	<i>Soldats retranchez du regi- ment, soldiers turned out of the regiment.</i>
	permutation: <i>Rendre un prisonnier pour pour</i> , for,	<i>un- autre, to return one prisoner for ano- ther.</i>
	conformity: <i>se- lon</i> , according to,	<i>Selon la raison, according to reason.</i>

I have some remarks to make on the preposi-
tions, as well with regard to all languages in gene-
ral, as to the French tongue in particular.

The

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The 1. is, that no one language has followed on the subject of prepositions what reason seems to require, which is that one relation should be marked only by one preposition, and that the same preposition should not mark more than one relation. For it happens on the contrary in all languages, as we have already seen in the examples taken from the French, that the same relation is signified by several prepositions, as *dans, en, a*; and that the same preposition as *en, a*, signifies different relations. Hence frequent obscurities arise in the Hebrew tongue, and in the Scriptural Greek, which is full of Hebraisms, because as the Hebrews have but few prepositions, they employ them for very different uses. Thus as the preposition π which is called an affix by reason of its being joined with the words, is taken in various senses, the writers of the new Testament, who have rendered it by *ev, in*, apply this *ev* or *in*, to very different significations, as may be seen in St. Paul, where this *in* is sometimes taken for *by* or *through*. *Nemo potest dicere, Dominus Jesus, nisi in Spiritu Sancto.* Sometimes for *according to*: *cui vult nubat tantum in Domino.* Sometimes for *with*, *omnia vestra in charitate fiant.* Besides several other different significations.

The 2. remark is that the French *de* and *a* are not only marks of the genitive and of the dative, but

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but are likewise prepositions which are used to express other relations. For when we say: *il est sorti de la ville*, he is gone out of town, or, *il est allé à sa maison des champs*, he is gone to his country house, *de* does not signify the genitive, but the preposition *ab*, or *ex*, *egressus est ex urbe*. And *à* does not express the dative, but the preposition *in*; *abiit in villam suam*.


The 3. is, that we must take care to distinguish the following five prepositions, *dans*, *hors*, *sus*, *sous*, *avant*, from the following five words that have the same signification, but are not prepositions; at least in general; *dedans*, *within*; *debors*, *without*; *dessus*, *upon* or *over*; *dessous*, *under*; *auparavant*, *before*.

The last of these words is an adverb, which is put absolutely, and not before the nouns. For 'tis right to say; *il étoit venu auparavant*, he was come before; but we must not say, *il étoit venu auparavant diner*, he was come before dinner, but *avant diner*, or, *avant que de diner*. And as to the other four, *dedans*, *debors*, *dessus*, *dessous*, I believe they are nouns, as appears by their being generally joined with the article, *le dedans*, *le debors*, *au dedans*, *au debors*; and that they govern the noun that follows in the genitive, which is the government of nouns substantives; *au dedans de la maison*, *within the house*; *au dessus du toit*, *on the top of the roof*.

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Yet there is one exception, which *Monf. de Vaugelas* has judiciously remarked, namely, that these words become prepositions again, when the two opposites are put together, and the noun is joined only with the last: as, *la peste est dedans & dehors la ville*, the plague is within and without the city. *Il y a des animaux dessus & dessous la terre*, there are animals above and under ground.

The 4. remark is concerning these four French particles, *en*, *y*, *dont*, *où*, which signify *de* or *a* in their full extent, and moreover *luy*, or *qui*. For *en* signifies *de luy*, of him; *y à luy*, to him; *dont*, *de qui*, of whom; and *où*, *à qui*, to whom: And the principal use of these particles is to observe the two rules, mentioned in the chapter of pronouns, namely, that *luy* and *qui* in the genitive, dative, and ablative, are generally applied to persons only: when we speak therefore in French of other things, we ought to make use of *en* instead of the genitive *de luy*, or of the pronoun *son*; likewise of *d'y* instead of the dative *à luy*; of *dont*, instead of the genitive *de qui*, or *du quel*, which last may indeed be used, but is commonly too flat; and finally of *où* for the dative *à qui*, or *au quel*. See the chapter of the pronouns.



CH A P. XII.

Of adverbs.

TH E desire men have to shorten discourse, gave birth to adverbs. For most of these particles are only to signify in one word, what could not otherwise be expressed but by a preposition and a noun: as *sapienter*, *wisely*, instead of, *cum sapientia*, *with wisdom*; *hodie*, *to day*, instead of *in hoc die*, *in this day*.

Hence it is that in the modern languages, the greatest part of these adverbs are generally more elegantly explained by the noun and the preposition: thus we rather say, *with wisdom*, *with prudence*, *with pride*, *with moderation*, than *wisely*, *prudently*, *proudly*, *moderately*; tho' on the contrary in Latin 'tis more elegant to make use of the adverbs.

Hence also it proceeds, that a noun is frequently taken for an adverb. As *instar* in Latin, 'as *primum* or *primo*, *partim*, &c. See the New Latin Method. And in French, *dessus*, *dessous*, *dedans*, which are real nouns, as we have shewn in the preceding chapter. But

But because these particles are generally joined with the verb, in order to modify and determine the action, as *generosè pugnavit, he fought valiantly*; they have from thence been called adverbs.



C H A P. XIII.

Of verbs; and what is proper and essential to them.

Hitherto we have explained those words, which signify the objects of our thoughts: we come now to treat of those, which signify the manner of thinking, namely, verbs, conjunctions, and interjections.

The knowledge of the nature of the verb depends on what has been said in the commencement of this discourse; *viz.* that the judgment which we form of things (as when I say *the earth is round*) necessarily includes two terms, one called the subject, which is the thing of which the affirmation is made, as *the earth*; and the other called the attribute, which is what is affirmed, as *round*: and moreover the connexion between these two terms, which is properly the action of the mind, which affirms the attribute of the subject.

Thus

Men therefore are under the same necessity for inventing words that should signify the *affirmation*, which is the principal manner of our thoughts, as for inventing words to express the objects of them,

And this is what is properly called a verb, *a word whose principal use is to signify the affirmation*; that is, to shew that the discourse in which this word is used, is the discourse of a man who not only has a conception of things, but moreover judges and affirms something of them. In this the verb is distinguished from some nouns, which signify also an affirmation, as *affirmans*, *affirmatio*; because they signify it only as by the reflexion of the mind it is become the object of our thoughts; and therefore they do not denote that he who makes use of these words affirms, but only that he conceives an affirmation.

We have said that the *principal* use of the verb is to signify the affirmation, because we shall shew presently, that it is used also in signifying other motions of the soul, as to *desire*, to *pray*, to *command*, &c. But this is only by changing the inflexion and mood: we shall therefore consider the verb at present only with regard to its principal signification, namely, that which it has in the indicative, intending to treat of the rest in another place.

Accord-

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According to this sense, we may say that the verb of itself ought to have no other use but that of making the connexion, which we make in our minds, between the two terms of a proposition. But there is only the verb *to be*, which is called the substantive verb, that remains in this simplicity; and further we may say, that it is not strictly thus simple, but in the third person of the present, *is*, and on certain occasions. For as men are generally inclined to abbreviate their expressions, they have generally joined to the affirmation other significations in the same word.

1. They have joined that of some attribute, so that two words then form a proposition; as when I say, *Petrus vivit*, *Peter lives*; because the word *vivit* includes both the affirmation, and the attribute of being alive; since 'tis the same thing to say, *Peter lives*, as to say, *Peter is living*. From thence arises the great variety of verbs in every language; whereas if only the general signification of the affirmation had been given to the verb, without joining any particular attribute, there would have been no occasion for more than one verb in every language, which is that we call substantive.

2. They have joined the subject of the proposition on certain occasions; so that two words, nay, even one may make an entire proposition; two words, as when I say, *sum homo*; because *sum* not only

only signifies the affirmation, but includes also the signification of the pronoun *ego*, which is the subject of this proposition; and in our tongue we always express it, *I am a man*: One word only, as when I say, *vivo, sedeo*. For these verbs include both the affirmation and the attribute, as we have observed already; and as they are in the first person, they include also the subject: *I am living; I am sitting*. From thence arises the difference of persons, which is generally in all verbs.

3. They have likewise joined a relation to the time, with regard to which the affirmation is made; so that one word, as *cœnasti*, signifies that I affirm of him, to whom I speak, the action of supping, not for the time present, but for the past. And from thence comes the diversity of tenses or times, which is also generally common to all verbs.

The difference of these significations joined in the same word, is what has hindered a great many, who were otherwise men of abilities, from understanding the nature of the verb; by reason they have not considered it according to its essential property, which is the *affirmation*, but in regard to those other relations, which are accidental to it as a verb.

Thus *Aristotle* confining himself to the third signification, added to that which is essential to the verb, defines it, *vox significans cum tempore, a word that signifies with time.* Others

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Others, as Buxtorf, adding the second to it, define it thus: *Vox flexilis cum tempore et persona*, a word which has divers inflexions with time and persons.

Others dwelling only on the first of the additional significations, which is that of the attribute; and considering that the attributes which men have joined to the affirmation in the same word, are generally actions or passions, have imagined that the essence of a verb consists in *signifying actions or passions*.

Finally Julius Scaliger thought he discovered a great mystery in his *principles of the Latin tongue*, by saying that the distinction of things into *permanentes & fluentes*, lasting and passing, was the true original of the distinction betwixt nouns and verbs; since nouns are to signify what is lasting, and verbs what is passing.

But it is easy to perceive that these definitions are all inadequate, and do not explain the true nature of the verb.

The manner in which the two first are conceived, shews this very clearly, because it is not there expressed what the verb signifies, but only with what it signifies; *cum tempore, cum persona*.

The two latter are yet more imperfect; because they are liable to the two greatest exceptions that can be made against a definition, which is their
not

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not agreeing either with the whole that is defined, nor with the thing defined only; *neque omni, neque soli.*

For there are verbs which signify neither actions, nor passions, nor any thing that is transient, as *existit, quiescit, friget, alget, tepet, calet, albet, viret, claret, &c.* of which we shall have occasion to speak in another place.

Besides there are words, which are not verbs, and yet signify actions and passions, and even things that are transient, according to *Scaliger's* definition. For 'tis certain that the participles are real nouns, and yet those of verbs active signify actions, and those of verbs passive signify passions, as much as the verbs, from whence they are derived: and it would be unreasonable to pretend, that *fluens* does not signify a transient thing, as well as *fluit*.

To which we may add in opposition to the two first definitions of the verb, that the participles signify also with time, since there are some of the present, the past and future, especially in the Greek. And those who think, and not without reason, that the vocative case is really a second person, especially when it differs in termination from the nominative, will easily perceive that on that side there would be only a difference of more or less between the participle and the verb.

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The essential reason therefore why a participle is not a verb, is, that it does not signify an *Affirmation*; hence it cannot form a proposition, which is the property of the verb, without adding a verb, that is, without restoring that which was taken away, by changing the verb into a participle. For, how comes it, that *Petrus vivit*, *Peter lives*, is a proposition, and *Petrus vivens*, *Peter living* is not so, without adding *est*, *Petrus est vivens*, *Peter is living*; but because the affirmation which is included in *vivit*, was taken away in order to form the participle *vivens*? Whence it is obvious, that the affirmation, which is, or is not found in a word, makes it to be, or not to be a verb.

And here we may remark by the way, that the infinitive mood, which is frequently a noun (and we shall prove it presently,) as when the French say, *le boire*, *le manger*, differs then from the participles in this, that the participles are nouns adjective, and the infinitive is a noun substantive, formed by the abstraction of this adjective; in the same manner as from *candidus*, comes *candor*, and from *white*, *whiteness*. Thus *rubet* a verb signifies *is red*, including both the affirmation and the attribute; *rubens* a participle signifies only *red*, without the affirmation; and *rubere* taken for a noun signifies *redness*.



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It is therefore certain, that to consider simply what is essential to a verb, the only true definition is, *Vox significans affirmationem*, a word signifying an affirmation. For 'tis impossible to find a word that marks an affirmation but what is a verb; nor to find a verb, that does not mark an affirmation, at least in the indicative mood. And it is undeniable, that if there had been a word invented, such as *est*, which should always signify the affirmation, without having any difference of time or person; so that the diversity of persons should be marked only by the nouns and pronouns, and the diversity of times by the adverbs, it would notwithstanding have the essence of a verb. As in those propositions, which philosophers call eternally true, such as *God is infinite; all bodies are divisible; the whole is greater than its parts*: the word *is* signifies merely the affirmation, without any respect to time; by reason that the proposition is true to all times, and without attending to any diversity of persons.

Thus the verb, essentially considered, is a word that signifies affirmation. But if we should chuse to add its principal accidents, it may be defined thus: *Vox significans affirmationem cum designatione personæ, numeri, & temporis*; a word which signifies affirmation, with the designation of person, number, and time. Which properly agrees with the substantive verb.

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But

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But with regard to the others, inasmuch as they differ by the union, which men have made of the affirmation with certain attributes, they may be defined thus: *Vox significans affirmationem alicujus attributi, cum designatione personæ, numeri, & temporis, a word which signifies the affirmation of some attribute, with the designation of person, number, and time.*

And here we may occasionally observe, that as the affirmation (as it is conceived) may be also the attribute of the verb, as in the verb *affirmo*, which verb signifies two affirmations, one regarding the person that speaks, and the other the person spoken of, whether it be of himself, or of another. For when I say, *Petrus affirmat, affirmat* is the same as to say, *est affirmans*: and in that case *est* expresses my affirmation, or the judgment which I form with respect to *Peter*, and *affirmans* the affirmation, which I conceive and attribute to *Peter*.

The verb *nego* on the contrary contains by the same reason an affirmation and negation.

For we must further observe, that tho' all judgments are not affirmative, and that there are some negatives, yet the verbs of themselves never signify any thing more than affirmations; negations being always marked by the particles *non, ne*, or by nouns that imply it, as *nullus, nemo*; which being joined with

with verbs change the affirmation into a negation,
No man is immortal, nullum corpus est indivisibile.

But after having explained the essence of the verb, and briefly pointed out its principal accidents; it is proper to consider these very accidents a little more minutely, and to begin with those that are common to all verbs, namely such as constitute the difference of persons, number, and time.



C H A P. XIV.

Of the diversity of persons and numbers in verbs.

WE have already observed, that the diversity of persons and numbers in verbs, proceeds from this, that to shorten discourse it has been thought proper to join in the same word, at least on certain occasions, the subject of the proposition, to the affirmation proper to the verb. For when a man speaks of himself, the subject of the proposition is the pronoun of the first person, *Ego, I*; and when he speaks of him, to whom he addresses his discourse, the subject of the proposition is the pronoun of the second person, *tu, thou, you.*

Now that we may not always be obliged to use these pronouns, it has been judged sufficient to give to the word which signifies the affirmation, a certain termination, which shews, that it is of himself the person speaks, and this is what is called the first person of the verb, *video, I see.*

The same is done with regard to him, to whom a man directs his discourse, and this is called the second person, *vides, thou seest.* And as these pronouns have their plurals, for example, when a person speaks of himself by joining others, as *nos, we*; or of him to whom he directs his speech, by joining others, as *vos, ye*; so the plural has also received two different terminations; *videmus, we see, videtis, ye see.*

But because the subject of the proposition is frequently neither a man's self, nor the person to whom he speaks; in order to reserve these two terminations to those two sorts of persons, it is necessary that a third be formed, to be joined to all the other subjects of a proposition. And this is what is called the third person, as well in the singular, as in the plural; tho' the word person which in rigor is applicable only to rational and intelligent substances, is proper but to the two former; since the third is for all sorts of things, and not for persons only.

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
By this we see, that what is called the third person, ought naturally to be the theme of the verb, as it is in all the oriental languages. For 'tis more natural that the verb should signify first the affirmation, without marking any subject in particular, and that afterwards it be determined by a new inflexion to include the first or second person, for a subject.

This diversity of terminations for the two first persons shews, that the ancient languages had a great deal of reason, for not joining the pronouns of the first and second person to the verb, except very rarely, and for particular considerations; being satisfied with saying, *video, vides, videmus, videtis*: For these terminations were originally invented for this very reason, to avoid joining the pronouns to the verbs. Yet the vulgar languages, and especially the French, never omit joining them, *Je voy, I see; tu vois, thou seest; nous voyons, we see; vous voyez, ye see*. Which is perhaps owing to this, that some of these persons happen very often to have no difference of termination: in French for instance, all the verbs in *er*, *aimer, to love*, have the first and third person alike, *j'aime, I love; il aime, he loves*; and others the first and second, *je lis, I read; tu lis, thou readest*: and in Italian oftentimes the three persons of the singular number resemble one another. Moreover some

of these persons not being joined to a pronoun, frequently become imperatives, as *voy, aime, lis, &c. see, love, read, &c.*

But besides the two numbers, singular and plural, which are in verbs, as well as in nouns, the Greeks have added a dual, which is peculiar only to two: tho' they use it but seldom.

The oriental languages have even judged proper to make a distinction, when the affirmation related to one or the other sex, the masculine or the feminine. Hence they generally give to the same person of the verb two different terminations to distinguish the two genders: Which is oftentimes of use, to prevent ambiguities.



C H A P. XV.

Of the different tenses or times of verbs.

ANother thing, which we mentioned to have been joined to the affirmation of the verb, is the signification of the time. For as the affirmation may be made according to different times, since we may affirm of a thing, that *it is, was, or will be,* for this reason other inflexions have been given to verbs, to signify this diversity of time.

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There are only three simple tenses or times; the present, as *amo, I love*; the past, as *amavi, I have loved*; and the future, as *amabo, I shall or will love*.

But because in the past, one may mark that the thing is but just now done, or indefinitely that it was done, hence it is that in most vulgar languages there are two sorts of preterits or past tenses; one which marks the thing to be precisely done, and is therefore called definite, as *I have written, I have said, I have done, I have dined*; and the other which signifies it done indeterminate, and is for that reason called indefinite or aoristus; as *I wrote, I went, I dined, &c.* which is properly said only of a time, that has at least the distance of a day from that, in which we speak. This is particularly true in French; for they say, *J'écrivis hier, I wrote yesterday*, but not *J'écrivis ce matin*, nor *J'écrivis cette nuit*, but *J'ay écrit ce matin, J'ay écrit cette nuit, &c.* For this language is so exact in the propriety of its expressions, that it admits of no exception of this rule, tho' the Spaniards and Italians sometimes confound these two preterits, using them indiscriminately.

The future will also admit of the same differences: For we may have a mind to express a thing, which is presently to come to pass. Thus we see, the

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Greeks have their *paulo post future*, μετ' ὀλίγον μέλλων, which denotes that the thing is just going to be done, as ποιήσομαι, *I shall do it instantly*. And we may likewise signify a thing, that is simply to happen, or to be done, as ποιήσω, *I shall or will do*; amabo, *I shall or will love*.

This is sufficient as to what regards the tenses or times considered simply in their nature, as *present*, *past*, and *future*.

But as it has been thought proper to mark also each of these tenses, with respect to another, by one word; other inflexions have been therefore invented in the verbs, which may be called compound tenses, and are three in number.

The first is that, which marks the past in relation to the present, and is called the *preterimperfect* tense, by reason that it does not signify the thing simply and properly as done, but as imperfect, and present with respect to a thing which is nevertheless already past. Thus when I say, cum intra-
vit, cœnabam, *I was at supper when he came in*; the action of supping is indeed past with regard to the time, in which I speak; but I mark it as present, with respect to the thing of which I speak; which is the entrance of such a person.

The second compound tense is that which doubly signifies the past, and for that reason is called the *preterpluperfect*, or more than perfectly past, as

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cœnaveram, I had supped; whereby I denote my action of supping to be not only past in it self, but likewise with regard to some other thing, which is also past: as when I say, *I had supped when he entered*, I give to understand, that my supping preceded his entrance, which however is also past.

The third compound tense is that, which denotes the time to come, with relation to the past, viz. the future perfect, as *cœnavero*, I shall have supped; whereby I signify my action of supping as future in itself, and as past with respect to another thing to come, which is to follow; as *when I shall have supped, he will come in*. This means that my supper (which is not yet come) will be past, when his entrance (which also is not yet come) will be present.

We might have added a fourth compound tense, namely that, which marks the future with relation to the present; in order to form as many compound futures, as compound preterits. And very likely the second future of the Greeks had this signification originally; whence it comes that it generally retains the characteristic of the present. Nevertheless custom has confounded it with the first. And even in Latin, we make use of the simple future for this purpose; *cum cœnabo*, *intra bis*, *when I shall be at supper you will come in*: whereby I signify my supping as a future action in

it self, but as present with regard to your coming in.

This is what has given rise to the various inflexions of verbs, to signify the diversity of times. Upon which we must take notice, that the eastern tongues have only the past and the future, without any of the other differences of imperfect, preterpluperfect, &c. This renders these languages subject to several ambiguities, which are not to be found in others.

C H A P. XVI.

Of the different moods or forms of verbs.

WE have already taken notice, that verbs are of that kind of words, which signify the manner and form of our thoughts, the principal of which is the affirmation. And we have likewise observed, that verbs admit of different inflexions, according as the affirmation relates to different persons and times. But men have found it proper, to invent several other inflexions also, in order to explain more distinctly, what passed in their

their minds. For first, they observed that besides the simple affirmations, as *he loves, he did love*, there were others conditional and modified, as *tho' he might have loved, tho' he should have loved*. And the better to distinguish these affirmations from the others, they doubled the inflexions of the same tenses, making some serve for simple affirmations, as *loves, loved*; and reserving the others for those which were modified, as *might have loved, would have loved*: Tho' not constantly observing the rules, they sometimes use simple inflexions, to signify modified affirmations. *Etsi vereor*, for *etsi verear*. And 'tis of this last sort of inflexions, that the grammarians have formed their mood, called the *subjunctive*.

Moreover, besides the affirmation, the action of our will may be taken for a mode of our thought, and men had occasion to signify what they willed, as well as what they thought. Now we may will a thing several ways, three of which may be considered as principal.

1. We *will* things that do not depend on our selves, and then we *will* only by a simple wish; which is explained in Latin by the particle *utinam*, and in English by *would to God*. Some languages, as the Greek, have invented particular inflexions for this; which has occasioned the grammarians to call them the *optative mood*. And there is in


French, and in Spanish and Italian something not unlike it, since they have triple tenses: but in Latin the same inflexions serve for the subjunctive and the optative. Hence it would not be amiss to strike this mood out of the Latin conjugations, since it is not merely the different manner of signifying, which may be greatly multiplied, but the different inflexions that ought to form moods.

2. We *will* likewise in another manner, when we are satisfied with granting a thing, tho' absolutely speaking we would not have it happen, as when Terence says, *profundat, perdat, pereat, let him lavish, let him lose, let him perish, &c.* Men might have invented an inflexion to express this movement, as well as they have invented one in Greek to express a simple desire: however they have not done it, but use the subjunctive for it. And in French they add *que*, in English *let*, *qu'il depense, let him lavish, &c.* Some grammarians have called this the potential mood, *modus potentialis*, or *modus concessivus*.

3. The third manner of *willing* is, when what we would have, depends on a person, of whom we can obtain it, and we signify to him the *will* or desire we have, that he should do it. This is the motion we have, when we command, or pray. 'Tis to express this motion, that the mood called the *imperative* was invented; it has no first person, especially

especially in the singular, by reason that no man is properly supposed to command himself; nor a third person in several languages; because properly speaking a person is said to command those only, to whom he addresses his discourse. And because the command or desire in this mood, has always a respect to the future, hence it is, that the imperative and the future are frequently taken one for another, especially in the Hebrew; as *non occides, thou shalt not kill, for kill not*. For which reason some grammarians have ranked the imperative among the futures.

Of all the moods above mentioned, the oriental languages have only the last, which is the imperative. And on the contrary the vulgar tongues have no particular inflexion for the imperative, but the method of marking it in the French is, to take the second person plural, and even the first, without the pronouns which precede them. Thus *vous aimez, ye love*, is a simple affirmation: *aimez, love ye*, an imperative. *Nous aimons, we love*, an affirmation; *aimons, let us love*, an imperative. But when we happen to command in the singular, which is very rare, we do not take the second person, *tu aimes*, but the first, *aime*.



C H A P. XVII.

Of the infinitive.

TH E R E remains yet another inflexion of the verb, that admits of neither number nor person, and is what we call infinitive; as *esse, to be; amare, to love.* But 'tis observable that the infinitive sometimes retains the affirmation, as when I say, *scio malum esse fugiendum, I know the evil is to be shunned;* and very often it loses it, and becomes a noun, (especially in Greek and in the vulgar languages) as when we say in French, *le boire, le manger;* and also, *je veux boire, volo bibere;* that is to say, *volo potum* or *potionem.*

This being presupposed, the question is, what the infinitive is properly, when it is not a noun, but retains its affirmation, as in this example, *scio malum esse fugiendum.* I do not know whether any body has ever taken notice of what I am going to observe; which is, that the infinitive is, I think, among the other moods of verbs, what the relative is among the other pronouns. For as I have observed, that the relative has this in it more than the other pronouns, that it joins the proposition in which it is, to another proposition; so I think,

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think, that the infinitive has beside the affirmation of the verb, this power of joining the proposition, in which it is, to another. For *scio*, is of it self as good as a proposition, and if you add, *malum est fugiendum*, you have then two distinct propositions; but putting *esse* instead of *est*, you make the last proposition but a part of the first, according as we have explained more at large in the ninth chapter of the relative.

Hence it comes, that the French generally render the infinitive by the indicative of the verb, and the particle *que*, *that*. *Je sçay que le mal est à fuir*, *I know that evil is to be avoided*: And then (as we observed in the same place) this *que*, *that*, signifies only this union of one proposition to another; which union is in Latin included in the infinitive; and in French also, tho' not so frequently, as when we say; *Il croit sçavoir toutes choses*; *he believes he knows every thing*.

This method of joining propositions by an infinitive, or by the particle *quod*, and *que*, is principally used in relating the discourse of another person: Thus if I have a mind to relate in French, that the king said to me, *Je vous donneray un charge*, *I will give you a post*: I shall not generally do it in these terms: *Le roy m'a dit, je vous donneray une charge*, *the king said to me, I will give you a post*; by leaving the two propositions separate, one for me, and

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and the other for the king: but I shall join them together by a *que*, *that*; *Le roy m'a dit, qu'il me donnera une charge*, the king told me, that he will give me a post. And then as it is but one proposition, and that mine, I change the first person, *je donneray*, I will give, into the third, *il donnera*, he will give; and the pronoun *vous*, you, which signifies the king speaking, to the pronoun *me*, me, which signifies only my self who speak.

This union of the propositions is likewise effected by *si* in French, and by *an* in Latin, in relating an interrogative; for instance, if I were asked, *pouvez vous faire cela?* can you do that? Relating it, I should express my self thus, *on m'a demandé, si je pouvois faire cela*, I was asked, if I could do that. And sometimes without any particle, only changing the person, as, *Il m'a demandé; qui etes vous?* he asked me; who are you? *Il m'a demandé; qui j'étois?* he asked me; who I was?

But we must observe, that the Hebrews, even when they speak in another language, as the evangelists, make very little use of this union of propositions, but generally relate discourses directly, just as they were made; insomuch that the *ὅτι*, *quod*, which they sometimes use, is frequently of no manner of signification, nor does it so much as unite the propositions. We meet with an example of this, in the first chapter of S. John: *Miserunt*

Judæi

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Judæi ab Hierosolymis sacerdotes & levitas ad Joannem, ut interrogarent eum; tu quis es? Et confessus est, et non negavit; & confessus est: quia (ὅτι) non sum ego Christus. Et interrogaverunt eum: Quis ergo? Elias es tu? Et dixit: Non sum. Propheta es tu? Et respondit, non. According to the common use of most modern languages, these questions and answers would have been related indirectly thus: *They sent to ask John, who he was; and he confessed, he was not Christ: And they asked him, who he was then, if he was Elias? And he said no: if he was a prophet? and he replied, no.*

This custom has spread it self even amongst profane authors, who seem to have borrowed it likewise of the Hebrews. And thence it is that the ὅτι, as we have already observed chap. 9. has frequently among them no more than the force of a pronoun divested of its use of connection, even when a discourse is related indirectly.

However, this does not hinder our retaining the common division of these verbs into active, passive, and neuter.

Those verbs may properly be called active, which signify action, to which is opposed passion, as *to beat, to be beaten; to love, to be beloved*: whether these actions be determined to a subject, which is called a real action; as *to beat, to break, to kill, &c.* or only determined to an object, which is called intentional action, as *to love, to know, to see.*

Hence it is, that in several languages, men make use of the same word, by giving it different inflexions, to signify both the one and the other; calling that a verb active, which has the inflexion by which they have marked the action; and verb passive, that which has the inflexion, by which they have marked the passion: *amo, amor; verbero, verberor.* This has been the practice in all the ancient languages, Latin, Greek, and Oriental: and moreover, the latter give to the same verb three actives, with each their passive, and a reciprocal, which partakes of both; as in French *s'aimer, to love one's self*, would be, which signifies the action of the verb on the very subject of the verb. The vulgar tongues of Europe have no passive; but instead of that, they make use of a participle formed of the verb active, which is taken
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in a passive sense, with the substantive verb, *I am*:
as *I am beloved, I am beaten, &c.*

So far as to what regards verbs active and passive.

Neuters, which some grammarians call *verba intransitiva*, are of two sorts.

The one does not signify the action, but either a quality, as *albet, it is white; viwet, it is green; friget, it is cold; tepet, it is warm; calet, it is hot, &c.*

Or some situation; as *sedet, he sits; stat, he stands; jacet, he lyes down, &c.*

Or some relation to a place; *adest, he is present; abest, he is absent, &c.*

Or some other state or attribute; as *quiescit, he is at rest; excellit, he excells; praest, he presides; regnat, he reigns, &c.*

The other verbs neuter signify actions, but such as do not pass into a subject different from him who acts, or do not regard another object, as *to dine, to sup, to walk, to speak.*

Nevertheless these latter sorts of verbs *neuter* sometimes become transitive, when a subject is given them, as *ambulare viam*, where *the way* is taken for the subject of the action. Moreover in Greek very frequently, and sometimes also in the Latin they receive for a subject the noun it self, formed


formed of the same verb, as *pugnare pugnam*, *servire servitutem*, *vivere vitam*, &c.

But I am apt to think, that the latter ways of speaking were intended to point out some thing particular, which was not intirely included in the verb; as when we would say, that such a man leads a happy life, which is not comprized in the word *vivere*, we say, *vivit vitam beatam*, and in the same manner a man is said *servire duram servitutem*, and such like. Thus when we say, *vivere vitam*, 'tis certainly a pleonasm, arising from those other ways of speaking. Hence in all the modern languages, it is reckoned a fault to join the noun to its verb; for instance we don't say, *to fight a great fight*.

By this the following question may be decided, whether every verb that is not a passive, does not always govern an accusative case, at least understood. I know this is the opinion of several very able grammarians: which however I cannot come into. For 1. verbs that signify no action at all, but some situation, as *quiescit*, *existit*, or some quality or condition, as *albet*, *calet*, have no accusative to govern: and with regard to the rest, we are to consider whether the action they signify has a subject or an object, which may be different from that which acts. For then the verb governs the subject, or this object in the accusative. But
when

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when the action signified by the verb has neither subject nor object different from that which acts, as to *dine, prandere; to sup, cœnare, &c.* then there is no sufficient foundation for saying, that they govern the accusative; tho' these grammarians imagined, that the infinitive of the verb ought then to be understood, as a noun formed by the verb; insisting that, for instance, *curro* is either *curro cursum*, or *curro currere*: however, this does not appear to be solid enough; for the verb signifies all that the infinitive signifies, taken as a noun; and moreover, the affirmation and designation of the person and tense; as the adjective, *candidus, white*, signifies the substantive drawn from the adjective, *viz. candor, whiteness*, and also the connotation of a subject, in which that abstract inheres. It would be therefore as reasonable to pretend that when we say *homo candidus*, *candere* ought to be understood, as to imagine that when we say *currit*, *currere* is to be understood.



C H A P. XIX.

Of verbs impersonal.

THE infinitive, which we have been explaining in the foregoing chapter, is what properly ought to be called a *verb impersonal*, by reason

reason it marks the affirmation, which is the property of the verb; and marks it indefinitely, without number or person, which is being properly impersonal.

Nevertheless, grammarians commonly give this name of *impersonal* to certain defective verbs, which have scarce any thing but the third person.

These verbs are of two sorts; the one have the form of verbs neuter, as *pœnitet*, *pudet*, *piget*, *licet*, *libet*, &c. The others are made of verbs passive, and retain the form, as *statutur*, *curritur*, *amatur*, *vivitur*, &c. Now these verbs have sometimes more persons, than the grammarians are aware of, as may be seen in the *Latin Method*, *Remarks on verbs*, chap. 5. But what may fall under our consideration here, and which few persons have attended to, is, that these verbs seem to have been called impersonal, only because as they include in their signification a subject, which agrees only to the third person, it was not necessary to express this fact, because it is sufficiently marked by the verb it self; and thus the affirmation and the attribute have been comprized by the subject in one word, as, *pudet me*, that is, *pudor tenet me*, or *est tenens me*: *Pœnitet me*; *pœna habet me*: *libet mihi*; *libido est mihi*. Where 'tis observable, that the verb *est* is not meerly the substantive, but implies likewise *existence*. For 'tis as if it were, *libido existit mihi*

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mibi, or *est existens mibi*. And the same may be said of the other impersonals which are resolved by *est*; as *licet mibi*, for *licitum est mibi*; *oportet orare*, for *opus est orare*.

As for the passive impersonals, *stat*, *curritur*, *vivitur*, &c. they may also be resolved by the verb *est* or *fit*, or *existit*, and the nouns verbal taken of themselves, as, *stat*, that is, *statio fit*, or *est facta*, or *existit*: *Curritur*, *cursum fit*: *concurritur*, *concursum fit*: *vivitur*, *vita est*, or rather, *vita agitur*: *si sic vivitur*, *si vita est talis*, if life is such: *Miserè vivitur*, *cum medicè vivitur*: life is miserable, when it is too much enslaved to the rules of physick. And then *est* becomes a substantive, by reason of the addition of *miserè*, which makes the attribute of the proposition: *Dum servitur libidini*: that is, *dum servitus exhibetur libidini*; when a man makes himself a slave to his passions.

Hence, I think, we may infer that the modern languages have not properly impersonals. For when, for instance, the French say, *il faut*, it must; *il est permis*, it is permitted; *il me plait*, it pleases me; this *il*, *it*, is properly a relative, which always supplies the place of the nominative of the verb, which generally follows in the construction; as if I say, *il me plait de faire cela*, it pleases me to do this, that is, *il de faire*, for the action or the motion to do, *cela me plait*, or *est mon plaisir*, that pleases

pleases me, or, is my pleasure. Wherefore this *il*, which few, I think, have rightly understood, is only a kind of a pronoun, instead of *id*, *that*, which stands for, and represents the nominative, understood or implied in the sense: So that, properly speaking, it is taken from the Italian article *il*, instead of which *le* is used in French; or from the Latin pronoun *ille*, from whence the French borrow likewise their pronoun of the third person *il*, *il aime*, *il parle*, *il court*; *he loves*, *he speaks*, *he runs*, &c.

With regard to the passive impersonals, as *amatur*, *curritur*, which the French render by *on aime*, *on court*, 'tis certain that these expressions in French are still less impersonal, tho' indefinite. For *Monf. de Vaugelas* has already observed, that this *on* stands there for *homme*, *man*, and consequently supplies the place of the nominative to the verb. See the *New Latin Method*, chap. 5. on verbs impersonal.

We may also observe, that verbs expressive of the effects of nature, as *pluit*, *ningit*, *grandinat*, may be explained by the same principles, both in the Latin and vulgar languages. For *pluit* is properly a word, in which for brevity sake, the subject, affirmation, and attribute are included, instead of *pluvia fit*, or *cadit*. And when we say, *it rains*, *it snows*, *it hails*, &c: it is there instead of the nominative, that is, *rain*, *snow*, *bail*, included with

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their substantive verb *est*, or *fuit*: as if we should say, *it rain is*; *it snow is made*; for *id quod dicitur pluvia est*; *id quod vocatur nix, fit*, &c.

This appears still plainer in some french expressions, in which the verb is joined with *il*, as *il fait chaud*, *it is warm*; *il est tard*, *it is late*; *il est six heures*, *it is six o'clock*; *il est jour*, *it is day*, &c. For 'tis the same as may be said in Italian, *il caldo fa*, 'tis warm, tho' in practice we say simply, *fa caldo*; *estus* or *calor est*, or *fit*, or *existit*; consequently in French, *il fait chaud*, 'tis warm, is the same as *il chaud (il caldo) se fait*, instead of *existit, est*; as it is still usual to say in French, *il se fait tard*, that is, *le tard se fait*. Or as in some provinces of France they say, *il s'en va tard*, for *il tarde*, *le tard s'en va venir*, that is, night approaches. And in like manner, *il est jour*, *it is day*, that is, *il jour* (or *le jour*, *day*) *est*, *is*; *il est six heures*, *it is six o'clock*, that is, *il temps*, *six heures est*, the time, or part of the day called *six o'clock*, &c. And thus in other the like terms.



C H A P. XX.

Of participles.

Participles are real noun adjectives; so that it would not be proper to treat of them here, were it not for the connexion, which they have with verbs.

This connexion consists, as we have already observed, in their signifying the same thing as the verb, except the affirmation, which is taken away, and the designation of the three different persons, which follows the affirmation. For which reason when it is restored to it, the same thing is done by the participle, as by the verb; as *amatus sum*, is the same thing as *amor*; and *sum amans*, as *amo*. And this manner of expressing by the participle, is more common in Greek and Hebrew, than in Latin, tho' we meet with it sometimes in *Cicero*.

Thus the participle retains the attribute of the verb, and moreover the designation of the time or tense, there being participles of the present, the preterit, and the future, especially in Greek. But this is not always observed; the same participle being frequently joined with all sorts of tenses: for instance, the passive participle *amatus*,
G 2 which

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
which passes among most grammarians for the present, is frequently of the present and future, as *amatus sum, amatus ero*: and on the contrary, that of the present, as *amans*, is very often of the preterit. *Apri inter se dimicant, indurantes attritu arborum costas. Plin.* that is, *postquam induravere*, and the like. See the *New Latin Method, Remarks on participles*.

There are active and passive participles; the active in Latin end in *ans* or *ens*, *amans, docens*; The passive in *us*, *amatus, doctus*; tho' there are some of these that are active, namely those of verbs deponent, as *locutus*. But there are others likewise, which add to this passive signification, a sort of a compulsive or obligatory sense, *that this ought to be, that this must be*: these are the participles in *endus, amandus, which ought to be beloved*; tho' sometimes the latter signification is intirely lost.

The property of the participles of verbs active, is to signify the action of the verb, as it is in the verb, that is, in the course of the action it self: whereas verbal nouns, which signify actions also, signify them rather in the habit, than in the act. For which reason the participles have the same government as the verb, *amans Deum*; whereas verbal nouns have only the same government as nouns, *amator Dei*. And the participle it self has the same government as nouns, when it signifies

rather

rather the habit than the act of the verb, by reason it then has only the nature of a simple noun verbal, as *amans virtutis*.



C H A P. XXI.

Of Gerunds and Supines.

WE have seen that by taking away the affirmation from verbs, active and passive Participles are formed, which are real noun adjectives, retaining the government of the verb at least in the active.

But there are also in Latin two noun substantives formed, one in *um*, called a Gerund, which has divers cases, *dum*, *di*, *do*; *amandum*, *amandi*, *amando*; but has only one gender, and one number; in which it varies from the participle in *dus*; *amandus*, *amanda*, *amandum*.

And another in *um*, called Supine, which has also two cases, *tum*, *tu*; *amatum*, *amatu*; but it has no more difference of gender or number; in which it differs from the participle in *tus*, *amatus*, *amata*, *amatum*.

I am not ignorant that the grammarians are greatly puzzled to explain the nature of the gerund, and that some of the most learned have supposed it

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to be an adjective passive, whose substantive was the infinitive of the verb; so that they pretend, for instance, that *tempus est legendi libros* or *librorum* (for both are used) is, as if it were, *tempus est legendi* & *legere libros vel librorum*. Thus there are two speeches, viz. *tempus legendi* & *legere*, which is the adjective and the substantive, as if it were *legenda lectionis*: & *legere libros*, which is the noun verbal, that then governs the case of the verb; or which as a substantive governs the genitive, when we say *librorum* for *libros*. But every thing considered, I don't see, that there is any necessity for having recourse to this explanation.

For 1. as they say of *legere*, that it is a verbal noun substantive, which as such may govern either the genitive, or even the accusative, as the ancients said, *curatio hanc rem: quid tibi hanc tactio est?* Plaut. I say the same of *legendum*, that it is a verbal noun substantive, as well as *legere*, and consequently that it may do all that is attributed to *legere*.

2. There is no manner of foundation for saying, that a word is understood, when it is never expressed, and cannot even be expressed without appearing absurd: Now there never was an infinitive joined to its gerund; and if we should say, *legendum est legere*, it would appear quite absurd: therefore, &c.

3. If

3. If the gerund *legendum* were an adjective passive, it would not differ from the participle *legendus*. For what reason therefore did the ancients, who were well acquainted with their language, make a distinction between gerunds and participles?

'Tis my opinion therefore, that the gerund is a noun substantive which is always active, and differs from the infinitive considered as a noun in this only, that it adds to the signification of the action of the verb, another of necessity or duty, as if we should say, the action which must be done. This seems to have been originally marked by the word *gerund*, which is taken from *gerere*, to do; whence it comes, that *pugnandum est* signifies the same thing as *pugnare oportet*, and the English and French which have not this gerund, render it by the infinitive, and a word which signifies *must*; *il faut combattre*, *we must fight*.

But as words do not always preserve the force for which they were invented, this gerund in *dum* oftentimes loses that of *oportet*, and retains only that of the action of the verb. *Quis talia fando temperet a lachrymis?* that is to say, *in fando* or *in fari talia*.

With regard to the supine, I agree with those grammarians, that it is a noun substantive which is passive; whereas the gerund, in my opi-

nion, is always active: but for a further discussion of this subject I refer the reader to what has been said in the New Method of the Latin tongue.



C H A P. XXII.

Of the auxiliary verbs in the vulgar languages.

BEfore I have done with the verbs, it may seem necessary to mention a word or two concerning a thing, which being common to all the vulgar languages in Europe, deserves some place in a General Grammar: and I am pleased to have an opportunity of speaking of it here, were it only to give a little specimen of the French grammar.

What I mean, is the use of certain verbs, which are called *auxiliary*, because they assist others in the formation of divers tenses, in conjunction with the participle preterit of each verb.

There are two, which are common to all those languages, *etre* and *avoir*, *to be*, and *to have*. Some have others besides, as the Germans *werden*, *to become*, or *wollen*, *to will*, the present of which being joined to the infinitive of each verb, forms the future. But it will be sufficient to speak here
of

of the two principal *être*, and *avoir*, *to be*, and *to have*.

Être, to be.

With regard to the verb, *être*, *to be*, we have observed, that it forms all the verbs passive in conjunction with the participle of the verb active, which is then taken passively, *Je suis aimé*, *I am beloved*; *J'étois aimé*, *I was beloved*, &c. The reason of this is obvious, because we have taken notice that all verbs, except the substantive, signify the affirmation with a certain attribute which is affirmed. From whence it follows, that the verb passive, as *amor*, signifies the affirmation of a passive love: and consequently as *aimé*, *beloved*, signifies this passive love, it is evident, that being joined to the substantive verb, which marks the affirmation, *Je suis aimé*, *I am beloved*, *vous êtes aimé*, *you are beloved*, it ought to signify the same thing as *amor*, *amaris*, in Latin. Even in Latin we make use of the verb *sum* as an auxiliary in all the passive preterits, and in all the tenses dependent on them, as *amatus sum*, *amatus eram*, &c. And in like manner the Greeks in most of the verbs.

But this very verb, *être*, *to be*, is frequently an auxiliary in another manner more irregular, of

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which we shall say something, after having explained the verb

Avoir, to have.

The other auxiliary verb, *avoir, to have*, is more extraordinary, and much more difficult to explain.

We have already taken notice, that in vulgar languages, every verb has two preterits, the one indefinite which may be called the aorist, and the other definite. The first is formed like any other tense, *J'aimay, I loved; Je sentis, I felt; Je vis, I saw,*

But the other cannot be formed without the participle preterit, *aimé, beloved, senti, felt, vu, seen,* and the verb *avoir, to have; J'ay aimé; J'ay senti; J'ay vu; I have loved; I have felt; I have seen.*

And not only this preterit, but all the other tenses, which in Latin are formed of the preterit: as of *amavi, amaveram, amaverim, amavissem, amavero, amavisse: j'ay aimé, j'avois aimé, j'aurais aimé, j'eusse aimé, j'auray aimé, avoir aimé: I have loved, I had loved, I might have loved, I might have loved, I shall have loved, to have loved.*

And even the verb *avoir, to have*, has these sorts of tenses, only by being auxiliary to it self, in conjunction with its participle, *eu, had; j'ay eu, j'avois eu, j'eusse eu, j'aurai eu; I have had, I had had, I might*

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might had had, I might have had. But in French neither the preterit *j'avois eu*, I had had, nor the future *j'auray eu*, I shall have had, are auxiliary to the other verbs. For 'tis right to say *si-tot que j'ay eu dine*, as soon as I have dined; *quand j'eusse eu*, or *j'aurois eu diné*, when I might had dined, or might have dined: but 'tis wrong to say, *j'avois eu diné*, or *j'auray eu diné*; we are to say only, *j'avois diné*, I had dined; *j'auray diné*, I shall have dined, &c.

The verb *être*, to be, takes these very same tenses from *avoir*, to have, and its own participle *été*, been, *j'ay été*, I have been; *j'avois été*, I had been, &c.

In this the French language differs from several others; the Germans, Italians, and Spaniards, chusing to make the verb, *être*, to be, an auxiliary to it self in the abovementioned tenses. Thus the Italians say, *sono stato*, *jè suis été*, I am been; which the Walloons, who speak bad French, frequently imitate.

Now in what manner the tenses of the verb, *avoir*, to have, help to form other tenses in other verbs, may be seen in the following table.

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Tenses of the verb *avoir*,
to have.

Tenses which they form
in other verbs, being
auxiliaries.

Avoir, ayant, eu
to have, having, had

Present { *Jay,*
I have.
Jaye,
I may have.

Preter-
perfect

1. *Jay diné,*
I have dined.
2. *Quoy que j'aye*
diné,
Tho' I have
dined.

Imper-
fect { *J'avois,*
I had.
J'eusse,
I might have.
J'aurais,
I might have.

Pluper-
fect.

1. *J'avois diné,*
I had dined.
2. *Si j'eusse diné,*
If I might have
dined.
3. *Quand j'aurais*
diné,
When I might
have dined.
4. *Quand j'eus diné,*
indefinite,
When I had
dined.

Aorist.

Aorist. { *J'eus,*
 { *I had.* }

Preter-
perfect
simple { *J'ay eu,*
 { *I have had.* }

Preter-
perfect
condi-
tional { *J'eusse eu,*
 { *I might have*
 { *had.*
 { *J'aurois eu,*
 { *I might have*
 { *had.* }

Future { *J'auray,*
 { *I shall or will*
 { *have.* }

Infini-
tive { *avoir,*
 { *to have.*

Partici-
ple pre-
sent { *ayant,*
 { *having,*

future
perfect
or of
the sub-
junct.

Infini-
tive
preterit

Partici-
ple pre-
terit

5. *Quand j'eus di-
né, definite,
When I had
dined.*

6. *Quand j'eusse,
or j'aurois eu
diné, con-
ditional.
When I might
have dined.*

*Quand j'auray
diné,
When I shall have
dined.*

*Après avoir dîné,
After having din-
ed.*

*Ayant dîné,
Having dined.*

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But if this manner of speaking, which is common to all the vulgar languages, and seems to be derived from the Germans, is so very extraordinary and unaccountable in itself; it is no less so in construction with the nouns that are joined to those preterits formed by these auxiliary verbs and the participle.

For 1. The nominative of the verb makes no change in the participle. For which reason in French we say, as well in the plural as in the singular number, in the masculine as well as in the feminine gender, *Il a aimé, he has loved; ils ont aimé, they have loved; elle a aimé, she has loved; elles ont aimé, they (in the feminine) have loved; and not ils ont aimez; elle a aimée, elles ont aimées.*

2. The accusative governed by this preterit makes no change in the participle, when it comes after it, as is generally the case. We must therefore say in French, *Il a aimé Dieu, il a aimé l'église, il a aimé les livres, il a aimé les sciences; he has loved God, he has loved the church, he has loved books, he has loved the sciences.* And not, *il a aimée l'église, or aimez les livres, or aimées les sciences.*

3. But when this accusative precedes the auxiliary verb (which seldom happens in prose, unless it be in the accusative of the relative, or of the pronoun): or even when it follows the auxiliary verb, but before a participle (which rarely occurs but in verse)

verse) then the participle ought to agree in gender and number with this accusative. Thus we must say in French, *la lettre, que j'ay écrite*, the letter which I have written; *les livres que j'ai lus*, the books which I have read; *les sciences que j'ay apprises*, the sciences which I have learnt. For *que* stands for *la quelle* in the first example, for *les quels* in the second, and for *les quelles* in the third. And in like manner: *J'ay écrit la lettre, & je l'ay envoyée*, &c. I have written the letter, and I have sent it, &c. *J'ay acheté des livres, & je les ai lus*, I have bought books, and I have read them. Likewise in verse the French say, *Dieu dont nul de nos mortels n'a les grâces bornées*, God whose merits none of our sins have set limits to, and not *borné*, because the accusative *grâces*, precedes the participle, tho' it follows the auxiliary verb.

Nevertheless there is one exception to this rule, according to *Mons. de Vaugelas*, which is, that the participle remains indeclinable, tho' it come after the auxiliary verb and the accusative, when it precedes the nominative; as *la peine que m'a donné cette affaire*, the trouble this affair gave me: *les soins que m'a donné ce procès*, the cares this law suit brought upon me; and such like.

'Tis not easy to account for these ways of speaking. However with regard to the French, which

I am

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I am examining chiefly at present, the following remarks may be of service.

All these verbs have two participles, the one in *ant*, and the other in *é, i, u*, according to the different conjugations, not to mention the irregular verbs; *aimant*, loving; *aimé*, beloved; *écrivant*, writing; *écrit*, writtch; *rendant*, rendering; *rendu*, rendered.

Now two things may be considered in the participles: one their being really noun adjectives susceptible of gender, number and case; the other, their having, when they are active, the same government as the verb, *amans virtutem*. When the first condition is wanting, the participles are called *gerunds*, as *amandum est virtutem*: when the second is wanting, it is then said, that the active participles are rather nouns verbal than participles.

This being supposed, I say that the two participles *aimant*, loving, and *aimé*, beloved, inasmuch as they have the same government with the verb, are rather gerunds than participles. For *Mons. de Vaugelas* has already observed that the participle in *ant*, when it has the government of the verb, has no feminine gender; so that it is not right to say, for instance, *J'ay vu une femme lisante l'écriture*, I have seen a woman reading the scripture, but *lisant l'écriture*. And if sometimes we say in the plural,

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plural, *J'ay vu des hommes lisans l'écriture*, I have seen men reading the scripture; I am apt to think that is a mistake owing to inadvertency, because the sound of *lisant* and *lisans*, is almost always the same, neither the *t*, nor the *s*, being generally pronounced. And I think also, that *lisant l'écriture* is instead of *en lisant l'écriture*, in *to legere scripturam*; so that the gerund in *ant* signifies the action of the verb, in the same manner as the infinitive.

Now the same, in my opinion, ought to be said of the other participle *aimé*, beloved, viz. that when it governs the case of the verb, it is a gerund, and incapable of receiving different genders and numbers, and that then it is active, and differs from the participle, or rather from the Gerund in *ant*, in two things only: one is, that the Gerund in *ant* is of the present tense, and the gerund in *é*, *i*, *u*, is of the preterit: the other, that the gerund in *ant*, subsists by it self, or rather understanding the particle *en*, whereas the other is always joined to the auxiliary verb, *avoir*, to have, or to *être*, to be, which supplies its stead on some occasions, as we shall shew presently. *J'ai aimé Dieu*, &c. I have loved God, &c.

But the latter participle, besides its office of being an active gerund, has also another, which is that of being a participle passive, and then it has the two genders and numbers, according to which it agrees

agrees with the substantive, and has no government. And 'tis in this sense, it forms all the passive tenses together with the verb *être*, to be, *il est aimé*, he is beloved; *elle est aimée*, she is beloved; *ils sont aimés*, they (masculine) are beloved; *elles sont aimées*, they (feminine) are beloved.

To resolve therefore the difficulty proposed, I say that in these expressions, *J'ay aimé la chasse*, I have loved hunting; *J'ay aimé les livres*, I have loved books; *J'ay aimé les sciences*, I have loved the sciences; the reason why we do not say, *J'ay aimée la chasse*; *J'ay aimez les livres*, is because the word *aimé* having then the government of the verb, is a gerund, and has neither gender nor number.

But in these other ways of speaking, *la chasse qu'il a aimée*, the hunting which he has loved; *les ennemis qu'il a vaincus*, the enemies whom he has vanquished; or *il a défait les ennemis*, if *les a vaincus*, he has defeated his enemies, he has overcome them, the words *aimé*, *vaincu*, are not considered then as having any government; but as being governed themselves by the verb *avoir*, to have; as if we were to say, *quam habeo amatam*, *quos habeo victos*; and therefore being taken then for participles passive, that have gender and number, they must be made to agree in gender and number with the noun substantives, or with the pronouns to which they are related.

And

And what confirms this reason is, that even when the relative or the pronoun precedes the preterit of the verb, by which it is governed, if this preterit governs still any thing else after it, it returns to be a gerund and indeclinable. For tho' it is right to say: *Cette ville que le commerce a enrichie*, this city which trade has enriched; yet we must say, *Cette ville que le commerce a rendu puissante*, this city which commerce has rendered powerful, and not *rendue puissante*; by reason that *rendu* governs *puissante*, and therefore is a gerund. And with regard to the exception mentioned p. 125. *La peine que m'a donné cette affaire*, &c. the trouble that this affair has given me, &c. It seems to be owing to this, that as it was customary to make the participle a gerund and indeclinable, when it governs any thing, and as it commonly governs the nouns that follow it; the word *affaire* has been considered here, as if it were the accusative of *donné*, tho' it be the nominative, because it is in the place, which this accusative generally takes in the French language, which is particularly nice in perspicuity, and in the natural disposition of words. This will be further confirmed, by what we are going to mention of certain cases, in which the auxiliary verb *être*, *to be*, takes place of *avoir* *to have*.

Two cases, in which the auxiliary verb *etre*,
to be, takes place of *avoir*, *to have*.

The first is in all verbs active, in conjunction with the reciprocal *se*, *self*, which denotes that the action has for its subject or object the very person that acts, *se tuer*, *to kill one's self*; *se voir*, *to see one's self*; *se connoître*, *to know one's self*. For then the preterit and the other tenses depending on it, are formed, not with the verb *avoir*, *to have*; but with the verb, *être*, *to be*, *il s'est tué*, *he killed himself*, and not *il s'a tué*; *il s'est vu*, *he saw himself*; *il s'est connu*, *he knew himself*. 'Tis difficult to find out the origin of this custom, for the Germans have it not, but use upon this occasion, as on most others, the verb, *avoir*: tho' the practice of employing auxiliary verbs in the active preterit is in all probability derived from them. It may however be said, that as both action and passion meet then in the same subject, it has been thought more proper to make use of the verb *etre*, *to be*, which is more expressive of the passion, than of the verb *avoir*, *to have*, which would have signified only the action; and that it is as if one should say, *il est tué par soi meme*, *he is killed by himself*.

But it must be observed, that when the participle, (as *tué*, *killed*; *vu*, *seen*; *connu*, *known*) relates only to the pronoun reciprocal *se*, *self*, tho' it should be

be reduplicated so as to precede and follow it, as when we say, *Caton s'est tué soy-même*, Cato killed himself; then this participle agrees in gender and number with the persons or things which are spoken of: *Caton s'est tué soy-même*, Cato killed himself; *Lucrece s'est tuée soy même*, Lucretia killed herself; *Les Saguntins se sont tuez eux memes*, the Saguntines killed themselves.

But if this participle governs any thing different from the pronoun reciprocal, as when I say, *Oedippe s'est crevé les yeux*, Oedipus plucked out his own eyes: then the participle having this government, becomes an active gerund, and has neither gender nor number; so that we must say:

Cette femme s'est crevé les yeux,

This woman has plucked out her own eyes.

Elle s'est fait peindre,

She sat for her picture.

Elle s'est rendu la maitresse,

She has made her self mistress.

Elle s'est rendu catholique,

She is become a catholic.

I am not ignorant that the two last examples are contested by *Monf. de Vaugelas*, or rather by *Malherbe*, whose opinion however, he acknowledges, has not been universally received. But the reason they give, makes me think they are mistaken, and affords me an opportunity of explaining several
other

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other ways of speaking, that are subject to much greater difficulty.

They pretend therefore, that we ought to distinguish when participles are active, and when they are passive; and in this they are right. Moreover, they tell us, that when they are passive they are indeclinable: and in this they are also right. But I do not apprehend, that in these examples, *elle s'est rendu* or *rendue la maitresse*, *she has made herself mistress*; *nous nous sommes rendu*, or *rendus maitres*, *we have made our selves masters*, it can be said, that this participle *rendu* is passive. On the contrary it is manifest, that it is active; and what seems to have led them into an error, is, that it is true, that these participles are passive when joined to the verb *être*, to be; as when we say, *il a été rendu maitre*, *he has been made master*: but this is only when the verb *être* is put for it self, and not when it stands for *avoir*, as we have proved it does, when in conjunction with the pronoun reciprocal *se*.

Thus the observation of Malherbe cannot take place but in other expressions, in which the signification of the participle, tho' joined to the pronoun reciprocal *se*, appears intirely passive; as when we say, *elle s'est trouvée* or *trouvée morte*, *she was found dead*. And then reason seems to require that this participle should be declinable, without minding the other observation of Malherbe, which

is, to examine whether this participle be followed by a noun, or by another participle. For *Malherbe* insists upon its being indeclinable, when followed by another participle; and therefore that we ought to say, *elle s'est trouvée morte*, she was found dead: and declinable, when followed by a noun; for which I see no manner of foundation.

But what may be observed here, is, that it seems to be often dubious in this way of speaking by the pronoun reciprocal, whether the participle be active, or passive; as when we say, *elle s'est trouvée* or *trouvée malade*, she found herself ill: *elle s'est trouvée* or *trouvée guérie*, she found herself cured. For this may have two meanings: the one, that others found her, and the other, that she found herself sick or cured. In the first sense, the participle would be passive, and consequently declinable; and in the second it would be active, and of course indeclinable. And there can be no objection against this remark, because when the phrase sufficiently determines the sense, it determines also the construction. For instance we say, *Quand le medecin est venu, cette femme s'est trouvée morte*; when the physician came, the woman was found dead, and not *trouvée*; because the meaning is, that she was found dead by the physician and by those that were present, and not that she herself found that she was dead. But if on the contrary I should say, *Madame*
s'est

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s'est trouvée mal ce matin, the lady found her self ill this morning, trouvé, then is proper, and not *trouvée*, because 'tis evident I mean to say, that it is she herself, who found and perceived she was ill; and therefore that phrase has an active signification. This coincides with our abovementioned general rule; not to make the participle a gerund and undeclinable, but when it governs; and always to make it declinable when it does not govern.

I am very sensible, that there is no certain rule as yet in regard to these forms of speech. But there can be nothing, I think, more conducive to this end, than attending to this consideration of the government, at least on all those occasions, in which there is nothing determined by custom.

The other case in which the verb *être*, to be, forms the preterit instead of *avoir*, is in some intransitive verbs, that is, whose action does not pass from the agent, as *aller*, to go, *partir*, to depart, *sortir*, to go out, *monter*, to mount, *descendre*, to descend, *arriver*, to arrive, *retourner*, to return. For we say, *il est allé*, he is gone; *il est parti*, he is departed: *il est sorti*, he is gone out; *il est monté*, he is mounted, or gone up; *il est descendu*, he is descended, or come down; *il est arrivé*, he is arrived; *il est retourné*, he is returned: and not *il a allé*, he has gone; *il a parti*, he has gone out, &c. Hence it is also that the participle then agrees in gender and number with

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with the nominative of the verb: as *Cette femme est allée a Paris*, this woman is gone to Paris; *elles sont allées*, they (feminine) are gone; *ils sont allés*, &c. they (masculine) are gone, &c.

But if some of these verbs, of intransitive become transitive and properly active, which happens when they are joined to some word which they are to govern, then they resume the verb *avoir*, to have, and the participle becoming a gerund, changes neither its gender, nor number. Thus we should say, *Cette femme a monté la montagne*, this woman, has ascended the mountain, and not, *est monté*, or *est montée*, or *a montée*. And if sometimes we say, *il est sorti le royaume*, he is gone out of the kingdom, 'tis by an Ellipsis; for then it stands instead of, *hors le Royaume*.



C H A P. XXIII.

Of conjunctions and interjections.

TH E second sort of words which signify the form of our thoughts, and not properly their objects, are conjunctions, as *et*, *non*, *vel*, *si*, *ergo*, *and*, *not*, *or*, *if*, *then* or *therefore*. For if we

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do but consider well, we shall find that these particles signify only the operation of the mind, which joins, or disjoins things, which denies them, or considers them absolutely, or conditionally; for instance, there is no object in the world, that lies out of our mind, which answers to the particle *non*, but it is evident, that it marks nothing more than the judgment which we make, that one thing is not another.

In like manner *ne*, which in Latin is the interrogative particle, *aisne? dost thou say?* has no object out of our mind, but only denotes the motion of the soul, by which we desire to know something.

For this reason I have made no mention of the interrogative pronoun, *quis, quæ, quid*; because it is nothing more than a pronoun, to which the signification of *ne* is added: that is, which besides its supplying the place of a noun, like other pronouns, expresses moreover this motion of the mind, which is desirous of knowing something, and wants to be instructed in what regards it. Hence we find that several things are made use of, to express this motion. Sometimes it is shewn only by the inflexion of the voice, which in writing is expressed by a little mark, called a sign of interrogation, and is figured thus (?).

In French the same thing is signified, by putting the pronouns *Je, I; vous, you; il, he, it; ce, this,*
after

after the persons of the verb, whereas in the ordinary way of speaking they go before. For if I say *J'aime, vous aimez, il aime, c'est*; I love, you loves, he loves, it is; this signifies the affirmation: but if I say, *aime-je? aimez-vous? aime-t'il? est-ce? do I love? do you love? does he love? is it?* this signifies the interrogation. From whence it follows (to mention it by the way) that we ought to say in French, *sens-je? do I feel? lis-je? do I read?* and not *sentez-je, lisez-je*; because we should always take the person we design to use, which here is the first, *je sens, je lis*, and transpose the pronoun, to form an interrogation;

And we must particularly observe, that when the first person of the verb terminates with an *e* feminine, as *s'aime, je pense*; I love, I think; then this *e* feminine is changed into an *e* masculine in the interrogation, because of *je*, which follows, and whose *e* is also a feminine; for the French never admit of two *e* feminines successively at the end of words. We must therefore say, *aimé-je, pensé-je*; and on the contrary we ought to say, *aime-tu, pense-t'il, marque-t'il*, and the like.

Of interjections.

Interjections are also words which signify nothing without us: but they are only sounds more natu-

ral than artificial, which mark the emotions of the soul, as *ah! alas! oh! woe's me! &c.*



C H A P. XXIV.

Of syntax or the construction of words.

TH E R E remains only to say something in regard to syntax or the construction of words together in a sentence, of which it will not be difficult to give some general ideas, pursuant to the principles already established.

The construction of words is generally distinguished into concord, when the words ought to agree together; and government, when one causes any alteration in the other.

The first is generally the same in all languages, because it is a natural consequence of the general usage, the better to distinguish our discourse.

Thus the distinction of the two numbers singular and plural, is the reason why the adjective is made to agree in number with the substantive, that is, that one be put in the singular or plural, according as the other is. For the substantive being the subject which is confusedly, tho' directly marked by the
adjec-

adjective, if the substantive marks many, there are many subjects of the form signified by the adjective; and consequently it ought to be in the plural number: *homines docti*, learned men.

The distinction of masculine and feminine is likewise a reason why the adjective is made to agree in gender with the substantive, and why they are both sometimes put in the neuter, in those languages that have a neuter, for it was for this very purpose that genders were invented.

For the same reason the verbs ought to agree in number and person with the nouns and pronouns.

But if at any time, in reading, you should happen to meet with some things which may seem contrary to these rules, it is by a figure of discourse, that is by having some word understood, or by considering the thoughts more than the words themselves, as we shall see presently.

On the contrary the syntax of government is almost intirely arbitrary, for which reason it varies greatly in all languages. For one language forms its government by cases; others instead of cases make use only of small particles, which do not even express all those cases, as in French and Spanish they have only *de* and *a*, which mark the genitive and the dative, and the Italians add *da* for the ablative. The other cases have no particles, but only the simple article, nor even that always. But

with regard to this subject I refer the reader to what has been already said concerning prepositions and cases.

However it will not be improper to observe some general maxims, which are of great use in all languages,

The 1. that there is no nominative case, which has not a relation to some verb expressed or understood: because we never speak merely to express the object of our conception, but to convey our sentiments of that object, which is the office of the verb to mark.

The 2. that there is no verb, which has not it's nominative case expressed or understood: because it is the property of the verb to affirm, and therefore there must be something to affirm of, which is the subject or the nominative of the verb; tho' before an infinitive there is an accusative, as *scio Petrum esse doctum*.

The 3. That there can be no adjective, which does not relate to some substantive, because the adjective marks confusedly the substantive, which is the subject of the form that is distinctly marked by this adjective: *doctus learned*, relates to some man who is learned.

The 4. That there never is a genitive case in a sentence, which is not governed by some other noun: because as that case always marks that which

is

is as the possessor, it must be governed by the thing possessed. Hence it is that both in Greek and in Latin, no verb properly governs a genitive, as has been sufficiently proved in the *New Methods* of those languages. This rule is with more difficulty applied to the vulgar tongues, because in French the particle *de*, *of*, which is the sign of the genitive, is frequently put for the preposition *ex*, or *de*.

The 5. That the government of verbs is often taken from different sorts of relations included in the cases, according to the capriciousness of custom. This does not alter the specific relation of each case, but only shews, that custom has made choice of this or that, according to fancy.

Thus we say in Latin, *juvare aliquem*, and *opitulari alicui*, tho' they are both verbs of aid, because the Latins were pleased to regard the government of the first verb, as the term, to which the action passes; and that of the second, as a case of attribution, to which the action of the verb has a reference.

Thus in French they say, *servir quelqu'un*, and *servir à quelque chose*, *to serve one*, *to serve for a use*.

Thus in Spanish most of the verbs active govern indiscriminately a dative or an accusative.

Thus the same verb may admit of different governments, especially intermixing that of the prepositions, as *præstare alicui*, or *alicquem*, *to excel somebody*. Thus, for instance, we say *eripere morti aliquem*,

quem, or mortem alicui, or aliquem a morte; And the like.

Sometimes these different governments have a power of changing the sense; according to the different custom of languages. For example, in Latin, *cavere alicui* is to watch over a person's safety; but *cavere aliquem*, is to beware of him: In this, however, the particular use of languages must be always consulted.

Of the figures of Construction.

What we have been saying in regard to syntax, is sufficient to understand it in it's natural order, when all the parts of the sentence are simply expressed, and there is never a word deficient or redundant, but all agreeable to the natural expression of our thoughts.

But because men are oftener directed by the sense, than by the words they use to convey their thoughts; and for brevity they frequently suppress some words in a sentence; or consulting elegance, they either insert some word which may seem redundant, or they invert the natural order of construction: This has produced four different ways of speaking, called *figures*, and which are so many irregularities in grammar, tho' sometimes they perfect and embellish the language.


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The figure which agrees more with our thoughts, than with the words of a sentence, is called *Syllepsis*, or *conception*, as when I say, in French, *il est six heures*, it is six o'clock. Here according to the words I ought to say, *elles sont six heures*, as was the practice formerly, and as they still say, *ils sont six, huit, dix, quinze hommes*, &c. There are six, eight, ten, fifteen men, &c. But because what I intend is only to mark a sixth time, and only one of these hours, that is, the sixth; I throw my thought on this hour, without attending to the words, and thereby I come to say, *il est six heures*, rather than *elles sont six heures*.

This figure makes us sometimes fall into irregularities of gender; as *ubi est scelus qui me perdidit*? of number, as *turba ruunt*: of both together, as *paris merse tenuere ratem*, and such like.

The figure which suppresses some words in a sentence is called *Ellipsis* or *Defect*. For sometimes the verb is understood, which is very common in the Hebrew, where the substantive verb is generally understood: Sometimes the nominative, as *pluit*, for *Deus*, or *natura pluit*: Sometimes the substantive, whose adjective only is expressed; as *paucis te volo, sup. verbis alloqui*: Sometimes the word which governs another, as *est Romæ*, for *est in urbe Romæ*: And sometimes the word which is govern-



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governed, as *facilius reperias (sub homines) Iqui Roman proficiscantur, quam qui Athenas.* Cic. *de Officiis*

The way of speaking which inserts some words that seem redundant, is called a *Pleonasm* or *Abundance*; as *vivere vitam, magis major, &c.*

Finally, that which inverts the natural order of construction, is called *Hyperbaton*, or *Transposition*.

Examples of all these figures may be seen in the grammars of particular languages, and especially in the New Methods of learning the Greek and Latin tongues, where they have been copiously treated.

I shall only add here, that there is scarce any language, which uses these figures less than the French: because it particularly delights in perspicuity, and in expressing things as much as possible, in the most natural and least intricate order; tho' at the same time it yields to none in elegance and beauty.

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